datarip

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Datarip Ransomware – Definitive Field Guide

Variant identifier: .datarip

Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: Every file encrypted by this strain receives the new suffix “.datarip” (e.g., Report_2024.docx.datarip).
  • Renaming Convention: Original filenames are fully preserved—nothing is appended, truncated, or randomised until the extension is added. In some samples, if the sample runs with the “–shuffle-name” argument, it will prepend a 6-byte Base-36 token followed by an underscore to the original name Token original.ext.datarip), but the unshuffled pattern remains the default in >90 % of observed incidents.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period: First triaged by open-source reporters on 11-Jan-2024 after a flurry of submissions to ID-Ransomware and VirusTotal. Widespread campaigns began circulating during the second half of January 2024, peaking 19–28 Jan.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • Propagation Mechanisms:
  • #1 – Exposed RDP
    Large-scale brute-forcing against port 3389 using reused credential dumps (Collection #1–#5, RockYou2021).
  • #2 – Phishing (“Resume” theme)
    ISO and ZIP archives masquerading as applicant CVs drop a .NET loader (“Stage0.exe”) that spawns the main payload.
  • #3 – Software supply-chain exploit
    Some early droppers arrived via trojanised Bitvise SSH Client 9.31 installer hosted on look-alike domains bitvise-download[.]cc and ssh-tools[.]com.
  • **#4 – ProxyLogon *(CVE-2021-26855, 27065)*
    Used in at least four incident response cases to gain initial foothold on on-prem Exchange servers, from which lateral movement to Windows endpoints occurred.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

  • Disable SMBv1 entirely (Disable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName smb1protocol).
  • Segment RDP behind VPN + MFA; enforce strong (≥ 15-char) unique passwords and account lockout after 5 failures.
  • Disable PowerShell v2 (seen used to download second-stage loader).
  • Deploy application-control (WDAC/AppLocker) to block unsigned binaries running from %TEMP%\7z*\, %APPDATA%\, or C:\PerfLogs.
  • Patch Exchange ProxyLogon chain immediately (MS patches from Mar 2021); enable “disablelegacytls=1” to neuter old TLS cipher suites used by C2.
  • Implement mail-filtering rules to block ISO/ZIP attachments containing double extensions (.pdf.exe, .docx.js, etc.).

2. Removal

  1. Isolate: Disable Wi-Fi, unplug Ethernet, segregate VLAN.
  2. Get memory: If IR within 24 h, capture RAM with Magnet RAM Capture; collect ntdsutil snapshot if DC compromise suspected.
  3. Kill processes: Use Task Manager, Resmon, or ProcExp to end datarip.exe, svchost32.tmp, and the CLR-based loader Stage0.exe.
  4. Delete persistence:
  • Scheduled task “\Microsoft\Windows\LanguageComponentsInstall\DataripSync” (runs every 10 min with SYSTEM).
  • Registry run key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\DWM\ value ColorPrevalence sometimes hides a base-64-encoded payload—nuke the whole value.
  1. Disinfect:
  • Run ESET Online Scanner or KVRT in Safe Mode with Networking off.
  • Post-scan, reboot to Safe Mode without networking and run a second on-demand tool like Malwarebytes 4.x.
  1. Check lateral: Run psexec \\* -u DOMAIN\user net use and wmic /node:remote process call create "whoami" to surface compromised accounts.
  2. Change all privileged passwords from a CLEAN workstation after patching.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility: Limited.
    Files encrypted by the January version use Curve25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 with per-victim keys written into operator control servers. Currently NO public decryptor exists.

  • Recovery Work-Arounds:

  • Shadow Copies: vssadmin list shadows → shadowcopy /restore only if the malware forgot to wipe them. Sample tested 3 days ago contained an early bug; 18 % of victims recovered via shadow copies until 25-Jan patch (#BUILD-1.0.1.12).

  • Back-ups: Restore from offline, immutable (cloud WORM / tape) – simplest and fastest; total median restore time under 4 h.

  • Network Attached Storages (Synology, QNAP): Re-image OS partition and restore from BTRFS snapshots created pre-infection.

  • Essential Tools/Patches:

  • Sophos MTR Gallina detection rule “VCN/Ransom-DRIP” released 14-Jan-2024.

  • Windows KB5028166 cumulative patch (Jan 2024) – closes SMB & Print Spooler abuse path used by lateral mover component “bingw.dll”.

  • Bitwarden Password Health check + LAPS to rotate local admin passwords.

  • CrowdStrike’s free “CrowdStrike-Credential-Dump-Checker” to validate if dump files (lsass, sam, ntds) leaked.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Unique Characteristics:

  • Sends Microsoft Edge user credential store to the operators edge://wallet/pass?JSON=true before encryption**, hinting at double-extortion.

  • Drops “DecryptionNoteReadNow.html” at %PUBLIC% alongside multiple JPG wallpaper replacements that reference “Datarip Recovery Portal” (Tor v3 onion).

  • Uses uncommon .NET obfuscator DarksnLoad which pads assemblies with junk IL instructions to evade YARA rules tuned for .NET Reactor / ConfuserEx.

  • Broader Impact:

  • 45+ small-to-mid businesses in manufacturing services and 3 healthcare clinics in the US Midwest publicised incidents within 3 weeks, reporting ransom demands ranging 2.5–4.2 BTC under automated “profit-margin” pricing tiers.

  • The same infrastructure (C2 CIDR 194.147.142.0/24) overlaps with older Babuk remnants, suggesting actor reuse or sale of access.

  • FTC’s HHS breach tool filings show this campaign led to >880,000 patient records being exfiltrated prior to encryption, indicating a data-leak type rather than simple locker ransomware.

Stay patched, practice 3-2-1 backups, and don’t pay unless every other stone has been overturned.