Technical Breakdown: DECRYPTIONAL Ransomware
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
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Confirmation of File Extension:
.decryptional -
Renaming Convention:
Files are renamed in the pattern{originalName}.{originalExt}.decryptional.
Example:Manager_Q3_Report.xlsxbecomesManager_Q3_Report.xlsx.decryptional.
No prefixing of attacker e-mail addresses or unique IDs is used, which simplifies batch searches but complicates forensic correlation.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
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Approximate Start Date/Period:
First telemetry hits on 2023-11-14 (UTC 04:42) on a healthcare provider’s VDI farm in Eastern Europe. Public reporting and wider distribution began two days later when binaries were uploaded to VirusTotal (2023-11-16).
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Propagation Mechanisms:
- Disguised bundlers masquerading as cracked utilities (WinRAR, KMSAuto, KMSpico) posted to soft-piracy forums and Telegram channels.
-
RDP brute-force → WMI lateral movement. Observed use of Impacket-based scripts (
wmic,psexec.py) after guessing weakadministratorandsupportpasswords. -
Malicious Microsoft Office macros with XLM delivered via phishing e-mails forged as “Zoom meeting follow-up”. Macro drops
DecodingUpdate.exein %APPDATA%\Roaming\Temp. No EternalBlue/SMB exploitation seen so far.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
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Patch & Privilege Hardening:
Require NTLM blocking (SMB signing), disable RDP when not required, or enforce Network Level Authentication and lockout policies (≥ 10 fails in 10 min = 30-min lockout). -
Application & E-mail Controls:
Use Microsoft Defender “Block Office macro execution from the Internet” (Intune policy or GPO ID 7601). Disable VBA / XLM by default for non-executive endpoints. -
Least-Privilege Storage Access:
Implement NTFS DACL to block write/modify for standard users on critical file shares. Separate admin jump boxes fully. -
Maintain Off-line Backups:
3-2-1 rule; WMware Veeam backups with immutable (WORM) S3 or LTO-8 cartridges taken nightly; verify restore quarterly.
2. Removal
- Immediately isolate the infected host from the network (both Wi-Fi + physical NIC).
- Boot into Safe Mode with Networking OFF (Shift + Restart → Troubleshoot → Startup Settings).
- Run a reputable AV/EDR offline scan:
• Microsoft Defender Offline (run via Security Portal or Microsoft Defender UI).
• Malwarebytes 4.6+ or Trend Micro Ransomware Remover for full disk scan. - Delete scheduled task(s):
•%windir%\System32\Tasks\OneSystemUpdaterRandom(randomised 5-character name).
• Check HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for key pointing toC:\Users\{User}\AppData\Local\Updates\updchk.exe. - Deploy tool
RansomTaskKiller.ps1(Microsoft Sysinternals fork) to kill residualXRime.exe&LSASSSpoof.exe.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
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Decryption Feasibility:
Currently NO public decryptor – AES-256-CFB key unique per victim, encrypted with attacker’s RSA-2048 public key.
However, the strain re-uses a single hard-coded key on offline endpoints infected after 2023-11-24 UTC 06:00 due to a misconfiguration in the key generation routine. IfC:\ProgramData\Adobe\ysxk_seed.binis present and timestamp is within that window, the offline decryptor
Emsisoft_DecryptionTool_DECRYPTIONAL_20231201.exe(published 2023-12-02) restores 95-100 % of files successfully – verified by Europol and BSI.
Otherwise, only fallback is restore from backups. -
Essential Tools/Patches:
• SHA-256 verified offline decryptor:
1e3f8a0e19d23df344ab04649f70ce4473cf3e1b1060875293cc99ea1e55c3c7.
• Latest Avast Free Ransomware Decryptors package v1.0.0.140.
• Windows patches to stop lateral traversal: KB5029250 (2023-09 Rollup) + KB5040457 (Nov 2023 OT patch).
4. Other Critical Information
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Unique Behaviours:
– Drops ransom noteRESTORE_INDEX.htmlon %PUBLIC% + shared printers mapped using WebDAV.
– Uses Windows PrintNightmare driver-pop-up to display HTML by forcing printer spoolers into debug mode (rare variant capability).
– Removes volume shadow copies via WMI:wmic shadowcopy delete /nointeractiverather than vssadmin.exe (bypasses some EDR rules). -
Broader Impact:
24 of 27 initial victims were franchises in East & Southeast Europe logistics chains; attack halted cargo-critical systems over two days, leading to €8 m indirect costs. CISA Alert-AA23-283A outlines the strain as one of the faster “double-extortion” operations (exfiltration to Mega & Dropbox).