easy2lock

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown – easy2lock Ransomware

(File extension observed: .easy2lock)

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmed extension: “.easy2lock” (case-insensitive) appended directly after the original extension
    E.g.: 2024-budget.xlsx → 2024-budget.xlsx.easy2lock
  • No e-mail address or random string is inserted; only the static suffix – low-to-intermediate sophistication indicator

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First publicly submitted: 2023-Q4 (multiple uploaders in Nov-Dec 2023 to ID-Ransomware & Malware-Bazaar)
  • Observed “noise level” in telemetry: remained low through 2024-Q1, suggesting either highly targeted campaigns or early-stage String-of-Pearls distribution
  • No open-source branding / leak site yet; therefore threat actors are either transitory or still in build-up phase

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • Most attacks analysed so far entered via:
    – Internet-facing SMB shares protected only by weak, reused, or previously-bruteforced credentials
    – Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing → credential grab → VPN/RDP/Royal (remote-desktop gateway) abuse
    – Pirated software (warez) installers carrying the dropper (“Activator-KMS.exe”, “Cracked-Photoshop.exe”)
  • No sign of automated worm-like component (EternalBlue, BlueKeep, Log4Shell, etc.). Infection hotspot remains human-driven – opportunistic route in, then rapid hands-on-keyboard deployment

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention (Harden against easy2lock immediately)

  • Harden SMB: close TCP/445 to the WAN; force SMB-signing; disable SMBv1
  • Enforce MFA on: VPN, RDP-gateway, OWA, Citrix, and any admin tooling
  • Limit lateral movement:
    – Unique local-admin passwords (LAPS / open-source equivalent)
    – Remove “everyone / authenticated-users” from shares; apply least-privilege NTFS & share ACLs
    – Use restricted-admin / protected-users group to stop credential dumping
  • Application control (AppLocker / WDAC) with “allow-list” – blocks unsigned .exe and .ps1
  • E-mail/Internet filters flag ZIP-with-ISO, IMG, or VHD attachments (phishing containers leveraged in early campaigns)
  • Segment backup infrastructure (immutability / air-gap). Veeam, Commvault, Rubrik, etc. all offer “Linux-hardened-repository” or Object-Lock; enable them

2. Removal / Incident-Clean-Up Playbook

  1. Evidence acquisition: power-on memory dump (WinPMem) if machine still up; clone disk to offline image
  2. Take infected host off network (both Ethernet & Wi-Fi)
  3. Identify persistence:
    – C:\Users\Public\svlol.exe (main dropper name may vary)
    – Run-keys (HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\svlol)
    – Scheduled Task (“OfficeUpdates” is common task name)
    – Service “SysHelpLog” (points to C:\ProgramData\hpvolume.exe)
  4. Boot a trusted OS (Windows-PE / Linux Live) and delete binaries + registry artefacts
  5. Install clean OS or roll back from verified, offline, application-consistent backup
  6. Patch OS / 3rd-party apps, change ALL passwords (domain reset if DC was reachable), rotate KRBTGT twice before AD rebuild
  7. Run full AV/EDR sweep (Defender-ASR rules, SentinelOne, CrowdStrike, etc.)

3. File Decryption & Recovery Options

  • No free decryptor exists at the time of writing. No master keys have been released, nor has a coding flaw been found (algorithm believed to be ChaCha20 + RSA-2048, built on Babuk codebase)
  • Recovery path therefore =:
    – Restore from unaffected, offline (WORM / air-gapped) backup
    – Volume-Shadow-Copy sometimes survives – check vssadmin list shadows quickly; copy data with ShadowCopyView if enabled
    – Recycle-bin / OneDrive / immutable S3 buckets / e-mail server retention are additional sources of readable copies
    – Paying the ransom (BTC ≈ 2,000 USD demand presently) is technically possible but strongly discouraged: no guarantee, funds crime, makes you a repeat target

Must-have Patch / Tool List

  • Windows cumulative patches No older than 2023-09 (numerous SMB & RDP fixes since)
  • Microsoft-signed “KB5004442” RPC runtime hardening (mitigates MS-RPRN abuse)
  • Security baseline tools:
    – Microsoft Defender with ASR rules (Block credential theft; Block process creations from PSExec & WMI)
    – open-source “Raccine” or “Malwarebytes Anti-Ransomware” as second-layer behaviour block

4. Other Critical Information

  • Ransom-note: HOW_TO_RECOVER_FILES.easy2lock.txt dropped in every folder + desktop
    Actors supply TOX-ID only (no e-mail) – supports theory of small operation
  • The executable strips recovery options: vssadmin delete shadows /all, bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No, wbadmin delete catalog -quiet
  • Differs from “Big-Game” families (LockBit, ALPHV) by:
    – Lower ransom demand, single-extension rename, no data-leak blog, no multi-thread lateral encryption – easier to cut off once detected
  • Potential broader impact: Although currently niche, the reuse of proven Babuk source code (including Safe-mode encryption, ChaCha20 stream speed) means coders can quickly add network-aware worm components. Treat early detections as a “small-fire warning” that needs extinguishing before it becomes the next large-scale outbreak

Stay patched, stay segmented, test your backups – and you will be resilient against easy2lock today and any of tomorrow’s variants its authors may compile.