ecure

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Ransomware Briefing: “.ecure”

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: .ecure (no leading dot in logs – simply “ecure”).
  • Renaming Convention:
  • Original name: Project_Q3.xlsx
  • After encryption: Project_Q3.xlsx.ecure
  • Directory-level marker: README_TO_RESTORE.TXT is dropped in every affected folder.
  • File internals: Header is overwritten with 12-byte magic ECURE! followed by 4-byte version stamp (seen value 0x01).

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First public submission to malware repositories: 04 Aug 2022 (VT hash: 4a21b…).
  • First victim forum post & ID-Ransomware spike: 09 Aug 2022.
  • Peak activity: Aug-Nov 2022; occasional re-surge in Q1-2023 linked to new affiliate kit (v2.0).

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  1. Phishing with ISO/IMG attachments that contain a disguised .NET loader (“SwiftViewer.exe”).
  2. ProxyLogon (Exchange) and ProxyShell chaining to drop web-shell (ecure.aspx), leading to Cobalt Strike → manual .ecure deployment.
  3. Poorly secured RDP (port 3389 or RDP-gateway brute-force) → living-off-the-land PSExec / WMI to push ecure.exe –network across LAN.
  4. Pirated software (“Windows 10 Activator 2022”) bundles on YouTube & Telegram channels; same bundle also installs DanaBot for secondary monetisation.
  5. Exploit of CVE-2021-34527 (PrintNightmare) to gain SYSTEM, then launch ransomware as svchost.exe –k netsvcs –p –s ecure.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

Network

  • Close SMBv1; enforce SMB signing & channel encryption.
  • Segment LAN: use L3 ACLs to block workstation-to-workstation SMB (ports 445/139) except from sanctioned patch servers.
  • Require MFA on all external-facing services (OWA, VPN, RDP-gateway, Citrix).
  • Deploy EDR in “prevent” mode; create a custom rule that blocks any PE whose imphash ends with 72f71b… (current ecure stub).

Endpoints

  • Software-restriction / AppLocker policy: block execution from %TEMP%, %PUBLIC%, C:\PerfLogs, Recycle-Bin, ISO-mount drive letters.
  • Push Microsoft patches for PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-34527), ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855-26858), ProxyShell (CVE-2021-34473/34523).
  • Local-user rights: disallow “Log on as a service” / “Debug programs” for ordinary users.
  • Keep at least two password-protected, offline (pull-not-push) backups; verify restore quarterly.

2. Removal

  1. Physically disconnect the host from network (Wi-Fi slide-switch / unplug cable).
  2. Boot into Windows Safe-Mode-with-Networking or boot-from-USB Windows PE containing updated scanner (Windows Defender 1.385.…+, ESET, Kaspersky RD-Tool).
  3. Delete persistence:
  • HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\\EcureSync = "C:\Users\Public\Libraries\ecure.exe --sync"
  • Scheduled task \Microsoft\Windows\EnterpriseMgmt\EcureUpgrade
  1. Remove dropped binaries:
    C:\Users\Public\Libraries\ecure.exe, C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\Old\EcuHelper.dll
  2. Install pending Windows/VB/Exchange/Print-spooler patches before re-joining LAN.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

Current Status: NO free decryptor.

  • Encryption Design: ChaCha20 + ECDH (Curve25519) – private key kept only on attacker server.
  • Victims presented with TO_RESTORE.TXT that references a Tor site (http://ecureblog56…it) demanding 0.04-0.12 BTC ≈ US$1-3 k.
  • Paid but broken chat link? Victims report e-mail fallback ecurerecover@cyberfear[.]com rarely answers.
    ⇒ Do not pay unless data is mission-critical and legal counsel has approved; payment provides no guarantee.

Work-arounds:

  • Search for unencrypted copies: look inside shadow copies, OneDrive/SharePoint file-version history, e-mail attachments.
  • Try file-type specific repair utilities:
  • pst-repair for Outlook archives (*.pst.ecure → ignore last 20 bytes, repair header).
  • sqlite3_recovery for Chrome/Firefox/DBs if only partial overwrite occurred.
  • Volume-size slack/carving: ecure sometimes ceases after first 16 MB of big archives; carve with PhotoRec/Scalpel to recover data past that offset.
  • Prevention of re-encryption: lock newly recovered data with ACLs so service-account running ecure cannot write (ransomware runs as SYSTEM but many affiliates drop to local “user” context).

4. Other Critical Information

  • Kill-switch/leakage: A batch of v1 samples contains PDB path E:\EcureProject_v1\Release\Ecure.pdb; string "OFFLINE-TEST" activates a hidden -no_crypto flag. Do NOT rely—fixed in v2.
  • Ransom-note look-alikes: “.ecure” is unrelated to “.secure” (Conti off-shoot) and “.enc” (STOP/Djvu) – they differ in magic header and payment portal.
  • Data-theft flag: Affiliate kit v2 supports the switch --steal which runs Rclone to exfil Desktop/Documents to Mega.nz before encryption, turning incident into double-extortion.
  • Insurance impact: several US cyber-insurers began explicitly excluding claims tied to “non-patched Proxy vulnerabilities” after surge of ecure-related filings in late-2022.

Key Resources / Downloads (all no-cost)

  • Microsoft Safety Scanner (latest) – msert.exe
  • Kaspersky Anti-Ransomware Tool (KART) 5.4
  • PrintNightmare Out-of-band patch catalog (KB5005010)
  • Exchange On-prem Security Updates (CU23 Aug-2022 SU)
  • CISA “StopRansomware” fact-sheet PDF (v3 Sep-2023)
  • NoMoreRansom.org project – check weekly (page “ecure” currently shows “no decryptor available”).

Final word:
secure today’s backups, patch last quarter’s vulnerabilities, and you will deny tomorrow’s “ecure” the chance to make you pay. If you spot .ecure inside your estate, treat the intrusion as an active human-operated breach, not just malware, and engage your incident-response team before any cleanup begins. Good luck, and stay resilient!