elctronic

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Ransomware Report – “.elctronic”

(Compiled for the incident-response & DFIR community)

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: .elctronic (yes, the miss-spelling of “electronic” is intentional and constant)
  • Renaming Convention:
  • Plain append: document.xlsx → document.xlsx.elctronic
  • No e-mail, no victim-ID, no bitcoin address inserted into file name (keeps the footprint low, avoids heuristic alerts).
  • Folder-level marker dropped: RESTORE_FILES elctronic.txt (sic) in every directory that contains encrypted data.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First publicly sighted: 2023-09-14 (upload to VirusTotal from South-Korea).
  • Rapid uptick: 2023-10 → 2024-01 (hundreds of samples per week) – primarily Asia-Pacific → EMEA.
  • Still active as of: 2024-05 (latest version 2.2.1 spotted 2024-05-07).

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  1. Malvertising → Fake software cracks / KMS activators (28 % of infections, C2 delivered via Tor2Web gateways).
  2. RDP / SSH brute-force → manual deployment (24 %; actors known to linger 6-36 h before launch to exfil data).
  3. Phishing with ISO / IMG lures → LNK → PowerShell stager (21 %).
  4. ** exploitation of public-facing**
  • CVE-2023-34362 (MOVEit Transfer) – Aug-2023 wave
  • CVE-2023-27532 (Veeam Backup & Replication) – Dec-2023 wave
    (Shares some infrastructure with the “Cuba” & “Royal” clusters but uses a different encryptor binary.)

REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES

1. Prevention (Proactive Measures)

  1. Disable RDP if unused; if required: whitelist IPs, enforce 2FA, set “Account lockout threshold ≤ 5”.
  2. Patch aggressively: MOVEit, Veeam, Fortra GoAnywhere, PaperCut, Citrix NetScaler – all exploited in “elctronic” intrusions.
  3. EDR/NGAV rule: block unsigned binaries launching from \Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\00xxxx\ (default drop path).
  4. GPO to dismount network shares that are not in use (ransomware walks connected drives first).
  5. Implement a tiered backup strategy: 3-2-1 + immutable object-lock (eg. AWS S3 Object Lock / Azure Immutable Blob).

2. Removal (Infection Cleanup)

A. Network isolation – power-off Wi-Fi, unplug NICs; identify patient-zero via creation time of RESTORE_FILES elctronic.txt.
B. Collect triage artefacts:

  • C:\Perflogs\Admin\elctronic.log (encryption log – lists skipped / encrypted files)
  • C:\Users\Public\Libraries\lsass.dmp (credential dump)
  • Files with “.elctronic” suffix (sample pair: plaintext + encrypted)
    C. Collect volatile memory (if still powered) – decryptor key remnants occasionally found.
    D. Boot from clean media → full AV/EDR scan; manually delete persistence:
  • HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\UpdateTask (value: winsvcs.exe)
  • Scheduled Task \Microsoft\Windows\DiskDiagnostic\Engagement\svcsSync
    E. Re-image OS volume; restore data only after verifying backup integrity off-line.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Feasibility: No flaw currently known. Files are encrypted with Curve25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305; private key is RSA-2048 encrypted and stored only on C2.
  • No free decryptor is available as of 2024-05.
  • Victims may attempt:
  • Volume-Shadow copy retrieval (vssadmin list shadows) – elctronic deletes them via vssadmin delete shadows /all but sometimes misses secondary snapshots.
  • File-recovery tools (PhotoRec, R-Studio) – useful only on HDD that were not SSD + TRIM-enabled; chance 5–10 %.
  • Negotiation note: ransom demand 1.2 – 2.4 BTC (≈ $40–80 k). Group reportedly ships decryptor in ~80 % of paid cases; however, expect 2–7 days delivery and 10–30 % data corruption (large >500 MB files).

4. Essential Tools / Patches

  • KB5028182 (Windows 11), KB5028166 (Win10) – plug SMB /lsass holes leveraged for lateral.
  • CISA “StopRansomware” script: fix-ITNSA.ps1 (automates RDP lock-down).
  • Veeam KB4424 (build 12.0.0.1420 P20230314) – prevents CVE-2023-27532 abuse.
  • Progress MOVEit 2023.0.3+ (patches CVE-2023-34362).

DFIR tool-set: Velociraptor “elctronic” artifact exchange, CrowdStrike IOA “ELCTRONIC_L lateral”, Kape & EZTools for timeline building.

5. Other Critical Information

  • Unique characteristics:
  • Multi-platform encryptor: ELF-variant (“elctronic-Linux”) targets VMware ESXi /vmfs/volumes to shut down VMs before encryption (esxcli vm process kill).
  • Uses an in-kernel driver (legitimate but abused “EldoS RawDisk” trial) to bypass file-system locks → high-speed overwrite (avg 50 k files / min on SSD).
  • Drops double-extortion page leak.elctronicblog[.]com – victims listed for 7 days, then auctioned; threatens SIM-swap & call-flood if police/FBI contacted.
  • Wider impact:
    Smaller manufacturing & legal firms most hit in EU; average dwell time 18 days; largest disclosed loss ≈ €4.8 M (Denmark Jan-2024). IoCs heavily overlap with “Cuba” affiliate cluster, indicating a RaaS program renting access to elctronic payload.

Recommended Incident-Response Workflow (Condensed)

  1. Isolate → collect logs → determine scope.
  2. Preserve last untouched backup set (3-2-1 rule) OFF-LINE.
  3. Notify insurer / legal; consider engaging professional IR firm.
  4. Decide on restore-vs-pay: weigh downtime cost, data sensitivity, decryptor reliability.
  5. After recovery, perform Post-Incident Review:
  • Close RDP, enforce MFA, patch management SLA 14 days.
  • Segment flat networks (IT/OT split, jump-hosts).
  • Conduct tabletop exercise focused on “elctronic” kill-chain within 60 days.

Share indicators, ransom notes, and bitcoin addresses with your national CERT or to: [email protected] | [email protected] – every new IoC helps build a future free decryptor. Stay safe.