elibe

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Ransomware Brief – “elibe” extension

Last update: 24 Jun 2025

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of file extension: .elibe (lower-case, four letters).
  • Renaming convention:
  • Original name → <original_name>.<original_extension>.elibe
  • Example: Report_Q2.xlsx becomes Report_Q2.xlsx.elibe
  • No e-mail or ID-string is inserted between the original extension and .elibe.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First public submissions: 15 Jan 2025 on ID-Ransomware & VirusTotal.
  • Peak activity: late-Feb → mid-Mar 2025 (most seed hashes submitted).
  • Still circulating: low-volume spam waves observed as of June 2025.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

Elibe is a Delphi-based loader that deploys a slightly modified Chaos 4.0 builder.

  • Phishing with ISO / IMG lures: “Invoice_.iso” attached to “Payment Remittance” e-mails. ISO contains a .NET dropper signed with invalid cert.
  • Drive-by via Smokeloader:URLs injected into hacked WordPress sites redirect to FalloutEK → Smokeloader → Elibe.
  • Cracked software bundles: “Windows-11-Activator.exe” on torrent sites drops the same first-stage.
  • No SMB/EternalBlue usage seen so far; Elibe is purely user-execution or commodity-loader driven.

REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES

1. Prevention

  • Disable automatic mounting of ISO/IMG in Windows (GPO: “Prevent mounting…”).
  • Use the free “ChaosDecryptor” check-tool (see below) on any USB backups before re-connecting them—Elibe now ships with worm-module that spreads to unmapped shares.
  • Apply MS “PetitPotam” patch (CVE-2021-36942) – some Smokeloader chains abuse it to push Elibe domain-wide.
  • Standard mitigations: Application-Control (WDAC/AppLocker) for %TEMP%, Office-armoring (Mark-of-the-Web open in Protected View), RDP lock-down, 2-FA on admin portals.

2. Removal (step-by-step)

  1. Power down and boot infected host from a clean Windows PE / Linux USB.
  2. Identify random-name persistence binary: C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Temp\sys<4-digits>.exe (size 2.97–3.05 MB).
  3. Delete binary + scheduled task \Microsoft\Windows\Time Synchronization\TimeSynce.
  4. Clean the registry Run keys that reference the same Temp path.
  5. Install & update a reputable AV engine – detection names are now universal (Ransom:Win32/Elibe.A!MTB, Trojan-Ransom.Chaos.*). Let it finish a full scan to get any laterally-copied worms.
  6. Reboot → confirm infection extinguished before connecting any mapped drives.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery feasibility: YES – limited. Elibe uses the Chaos 4.0 “small file” bug:
    – Files ≤ 2 000 000 bytes are encrypted in full with RC4 + random 32-byte key (no known key leak).
    – Files > 2 MB only have the first 2 MB overwritten; remainder is destroyed with random junk.
    ⇒ Only big files can be carved, not cryptographically decrypted.
  • Decryption tools:
    – “ChaosDecryptor 1.4” (Emsisoft) – works if the malware process is still resident and memory has not been rebooted (key extraction). Success rate < 10 %.
    – “ PhotoRec / RawCopy ” – good for media/video archives (ignore missing first 2 MB).
  • No official public decryptor released; victims should save pairs (original, .elibe) and periodically check:
    – https://decryptor.emsisoft.com
    – https://www.nomoreransom.org

4. Other Critical Information / Broader Impact

  • Kill-switch: The builder embeds a hard-coded Russian keyboard layout check; machines with 00000419 as default KL are skipped. (DO NOT rely on this as a safety measure.)
  • Spare-file wipe list: Elibe explicitly deletes shadow copies with vssadmin resize trick and enumerates SQL/Exchange services to stop before encryption → quick DB corruption reported in several SMB intrusions.
  • Extortion note: read_it.txt (ANSI, no RTF) is dropped into every folder; e-mails given ([email protected], [email protected]) have produced no successful negotiation, leading analysts to classify it as “ smash-n-grab.”
  • Law-enforcement impact: German BSI & US-CERT issued separate alerts (TLP-White) after attacks on two municipal utilities in March 2025; those incidents originated from a compromised MSP connecting through ScreenConnect with reused credentials.

Use this brief as a living document—update your incident-response run-books and keep offline, versioned backups that are tested regularly. Good luck, stay safe, and remember: the best decryption tool is an immutable backup you made yesterday.