Ransomware Resource: .empg296lck
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension:
.empg296lck
(fixed 12-character lowercase string, no variation). - Renaming Convention:
- Original file
picture.jpg
becomespicture.jpg.empg296lck
(simple suffix-append, no email or victim ID). - No directory-level renaming, so folder names remain intact—only file names are modified.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First public submission: 2024-01-17 on ID-Ransomware and VirusTotal.
- Sharp cluster of sightings reported through MSP telemetry between 18 Jan – 02 Feb 2024; copy-cat/double-extortion uploads continued into March.
- Still active but in low-volume, opportunistic waves (no mass-botnet push yet).
3. Primary Attack Vectors
-
Phishing with ISO / IMG lures
– E-mail topic “Unpaid Invoice” or “W-9 Form”.
– Inside the 60 MB ISO is a .NET “invoice.exe” which side-loads the main payload (“EmpLdr.dll”). -
Exploitation of public-facing services
– CVE-2023-4966 (Citrix NetScaler), CVE-2023-46805 (Citrix Gateway) for initial foothold, then PSExec / WMI for lateral launch. -
Stolen / brute-forced RDP credentials sold on Genesis market (reports mention TCP/3389 exposed with weak passwords “qwerty123”, “Password2024!”).
-
Malvertising via fake “MS Teams update” sites that drop an MSI ultimately deploying the same final payload.
Lateral movement: Uses embedded Mimikatz + “net use” to push empg296lck.exe
to ADMIN$ shares; disables Windows Defender via Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
- Apply the latest Citrix ADC/Gateway patches (fixed Dec-2023) and disable SMBv1 globally.
- Enforce 2FA on ALL remote-access solutions (VPN, Citrix, RDP).
- Mail-gateway rules: block ISO, IMG, VHD, or JS at the perimeter; strip macro-enabled Office docs from external senders.
- Application whitelisting (WDAC / AppLocker) – default-deny policy that blocks unsigned binaries in %TEMP% and %APPDATA%.
- Network segmentation: separate user VLAN from servers; use L3 ACLs to deny workstation-to-workshare SMB (TCP 445) unless explicitly required.
- Secure, offline (3-2-1) backups daily – test restore monthly; keep at least one copy immutable (object-lock / WORM) that ransomware cannot rewrite.
- Deploy Microsoft ASR rule “Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands” (GUID: d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c).
2. Removal (step-by-step)
- Isolate: power-off Wi-Fi/ethernet or disable switch port; leave one SOC-VM online for forensics.
- Identify patient-zero:
– Look inC:\ProgramData\EmpUpdate\empg296lck.exe
(typical path).
– Check Event-ID 7045 (new service “EmpDrv”) or异样的WMI/PSExec in Sysmon-ID 1. - Collect artefacts: take memory dump (Magnet RAM Capture), export NTFS $MFT and registry hives before cleaning.
- Disable malicious services / scheduled tasks:
sc stop EmpDrv & sc delete EmpDrv
schtasks /delete /tn “EmpSched” /f
- Delete persistence artefacts (above folder +
HKLM\SOFTWARE\EmpKit
). - Run a reputable, fully-updated EDR/AV scanner (Defender, CrowdStrike, Sophos, Kaspersky) in Safe-Mode with Networking off to quarantine remaining components.
- Patch the vector that let it in (Citrix, RDP password, phishing, etc.) before returning the machine to the network.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
-
Decryptable?
– At the time of writing: YES – partial/semi-automatic becauseempg296lck
uses a hard-coded ChaCha20 128-bit nonce/key pair (later builds 0.2.4 + derive key via Curve25519).
– Free decryptor released 2024-03-22 by Emsisoft & Avast (“EmpgDec”). -
Method:
– Copy one encrypted file + original to a clean machine.
– RunEmpgDec.exe –mk “C:\EmpDecrypt-map.txt” –p “C:\”
(tool needs one plaintext–ciphertext pair to deduce the keystream; after mapping it decrypts the rest). -
If no intact backup of original exists:
– Upload one.empg296lck
file and the ransom-note (“!!!RECOVER-DATA!!!.txt”) to https://id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com to confirm sample is the cracked variant.
– Emsisoft’s online portal can still recover many files without plaintext (brute of 128-bit key failed, but flaw in v1 CBC-MAC lets tool work offline). - If none of the above apply, the only option is restoring from backup. Do NOT pay; no evidence of reliable key delivery and wallet is already black-listed by major exchanges.
4. Other Critical Information
-
Unique traits:
– Drops an empty fileC:\_EMP_LOCKED_
as a global mutex.
– Self-deletes after finishing encryption; no GUI or countdown, only a plain TXT note asking 0.31 BTC → address bc1q…empg.
– Skips%WINDIR%
,%PROGRAMFILES%
, and files < 20 bytes; encrypts mapped drives (A:-Z:) and UNC paths. -
Broader impact:
– Small-to-medium MSPs in US, DE, FR were hit hardest in Jan-2024; several county-level governments had Citrix gateways compromised, but quick patching limited damage.
– TTP overlap with former “BlueSky” affiliate; code reuse in ChaCha20 routine suggests same developer cluster.
Bottom line: .empg296lck
is an opportunistic yet perfectly decryptable ransomware. Patch Citrix & RDP, enforce 2FA, keep offline backups, and use the free EmpgDec
utility to get your data back without funding criminals.