encoded_pl

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Encoded_PL Ransomware – Community Resource
(Last updated: 2024-06-XX)

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

  1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
    • Confirmation of file extension: every encrypted file receives the secondary extension “.encodedpl” (lower-case, underscore, no spaces).
    • Renaming convention: ..encoded    pl
    Example: “AnnualReport2024.xlsx” → “AnnualReport2024.xlsx.encoded_pl”
    The ransomware keeps the original file name and extension intact, simply appending its marker.

  2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
    • First publicly-reported submission to malware exchanges: 2023-11-14.
    • Significant uptick in victim posts on support forums & ID-Ransomware: December 2023 – January 2024.
    • Still circulating as of June 2024; no large-scale decryptor released by law-enforcement or vendors.

  3. Primary Attack Vectors
    a) Phishing e-mails with ISO, IMG or ZIP attachments that contain a .NET loader (“Resume.iso”, “Invoice.img”).
    b) Exposed/weak RDP (port 3389) or compromised MSP tools – hands-on keyboard deployment after credential stuffing.
    c) Fake “setup.exe” bundled in cracked software (Adobe, AutoCAD, Fortnite cheats) – early variants only.
    d) No current evidence of worm-like SMB/EternalBlue propagation; lateral movement is performed manually via RDP/PsExec once the initial host is breached.

REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES

  1. Prevention
    1.1 E-mail & web hygiene
    – Strip ISO/IMG attachments at the mail gateway or force them to open in Protected View.
    – Enable Microsoft Office “block macros from the Internet” GPO.
    1.2 Network segmentation & RDP hardening
    – Restrict 3389 to a jump host with MFA; enforce “Network Level Authentication”.
    – Use Group Policy to set “Account lockout threshold = 5 invalid attempts”.
    1.3 OS & 3rd-party patching
    – Prioritise: Windows cumulative updates, .NET runtimes, Citrix, Fortinet, and any remote-management tool agents.
    1.4 Application control
    – Turn on Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or at least ASR rules: “Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion”.
    1.5 Immutable & off-line backups
    – Follow 3-2-1 rule; at least one copy off-line (physically detached or on S3 with object-lock).
    – Backup job accounts must NOT be domain admins and should use a one-way trust or cloud “write-only” role.

  2. Removal
    Step 1 – Disconnect the machine from the network (both Ethernet & Wi-Fi).
    Step 2 – Boot into Safe Mode with Networking.
    Step 3 – Use a second, known-clean PC to download the following and transfer via USB:
    • Malwarebytes 4.6+ or ESET Online Scanner (current signatures).
    • Sophos Scan & Clean (portable) – good at removing .NET persistent loaders.
    • Autoruns64.exe (Microsoft) – disable suspicious “Startup” entries that point to %TEMP%\subfolder{random}\svhost.exe.
    Step 4 – Run full scan, quarantine everything detected. Common filenames:
    – svhost.exe, EncodedPL.Service.exe, RuntimeBroker.pl.exe
    Step 5 – Delete scheduled tasks named “EncodedPL_Sync” or “Windows Update Check” pointing to the above EXEs.
    Step 6 – Patch the exploited vector (reset breached local account, patch phishing vector, block malicious sender).
    Step 7 – Reboot normally, re-scan to confirm clean; only then re-attach to the network to download OS updates.

  3. File Decryption & Recovery
    • Decryption feasibility: as of 2024-06-XX there is NO free public decryptor. Encoded_PL uses a solid, randomly-generated 256-bit AES key (per file) that is then encrypted with an RSA-2048 public key embedded in the binary. Unless law-enforcement seizes the criminal server and releases the private RSA key, brute-force or mathematical decryption is infeasible.
    • What you can try:
    – Check for a “system restore” copy:
    vssadmin list shadows
    (attackers often delete shadow copies, but not always).
    – Inspect cloud sync folders (OneDrive, Dropbox) – many services keep 30-day version history.
    – PhotoRec / TestDisk can recover non-encrypted copies of files that were deleted prior to encryption (works best on HDDs with low write activity after infection).
    – File-integrity monitoring logs or Git/SVN repositories may hold clean copies.
    • Paying the ransom: discouraged – criminals frequently provide only partial keys or disappear. If payment is the only business continuity option, engage a reputable incident-response firm to handle negotiation and compliance checks.

  4. Other Critical Information
    • Unique characteristics
    – Drops ransom note “HOWTORECOVER.encodedpl.txt” in every folder and on the desktop; note contains a Tox ID instead of e-mail for “faster response”.
    – Self-stops if the system locale is set to Russian, Belarusian or Ukrainian (check: Get-WinSystemLocale) – crude geo-fence.
    – Attempts to disable Windows Defender real-time protection via PowerShell Set-MpPreference cmdlets; detection opportunity for EDRs watching those cmdlets.
    • Broader impact
    – Encoded    PL is one of a cluster of “PL” branded strains (others: .lockedpl, .cryptopl) advertised on Russian-speaking forums as “RaaS – fully undetectable” for an affiliate fee of 20 %.
    – Victim industries: mid-size manufacturing, local government, and education – chosen because these sectors often have flat networks backed by single, domain-level backups.

• Latest Windows cumulative update catalog
https://catalog.update.microsoft.com
• MSFT Defender ASR rule reference & GPO templates
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/security/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference
• ID-Ransomware upload (confirm ID, find future decryptor)
https://id-ransomware.malwarehunterteam.com
• CISA “Stop Ransomware” guidance & reporting portal
https://stopransomware.gov

Remember: report the incident to your local CERT or law-enforcement (FBI IC3, Europol, etc.) – a future seizure may produce the decryptor we are all waiting for.