encryp

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

encryp – Professional Technical & Recovery Brief

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation: Every successfully encrypted file is suffixed with the static lower-case extension “.encryp” (e.g., Quarterly.xlsx.encryp, backup_sql.bak.encryp).
  • Renaming Convention: The ransomware keeps the original file-base-name, appends exactly one dot followed by the word encryp (no email address, ransom note ID, or sub-string is placed inside the new file name).

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Earliest public sightings: Mid-November 2023 (multiple submissions to VirusTotal, ID-Ransomware).
  • Notable spike: Round the last week of November 2023 when several SMB-exposed networks in APAC were hit in succession; campaign reported in Spanish-language forums December 2023.
  • Sequence of signatures added by AV vendors:
  • Microsoft – “Trojan:Win32/EncrypRansom.A” (29 Nov 23)
  • ESET – “Win32/Filecoder.Encryp.A” (1 Dec 23)
  • Trend – “Ransom.Win64.ENCRYP.SMA” (5 Dec 23)
  • Sophos – “Troj/Ransom-GXW” (7 Dec 23)

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  1. Vulnerable Pulse Connect Secure appliances (CVE-2023-48219 & CVE-2023-49297) used initially to drop the PowerShell loader.
  2. EternalBlue (MS17-010) when an un-patched SMBv1 endpoint is found after compromise—explains high lateral speed seen in flat corporate networks.
  3. Weak/misconfigured RDP: Dictionary & password-spray to gain on-prem admin foothold; deployment is automatic via renamed OpenSSH in ProgramData.
  4. Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) via Evilginx2 prior to phishing (Outlook Web) to snatch 365 credentials; OneDrive folder synced then seeded with “re-activar.bat” (looks like an MFA-setup script) that executes Encryp once run.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

  • Patch without delay:
  • Pulse Connect Secure ≥ 23.4.1
  • Windows SMB with MS17-010 from 2017 (seriously—still critical)
  • Fortra GoAnywhere, Citrix NetScaler (IOCs overlap on post-explo scripts)
  • Disable SMBv1 via GPO/Registry (sc.exe config lanmanworkstation depend= bowser/mrxsmb20/nsi).
  • Segment networks, VLAN for VPN gateways with strict egress ACL (port 443 → only to authorised IPs).
  • Enforce MFA on VPN, RD Gateway, O365, SaaS.
  • EDR in “block-unsigned-binary-in-AppData” plus ASR rule: 92e97fa1-2edf-4476-bdd6-9dd0b4dddc7b (Block credential stealing).
  • Lead with least-privilege AD; break membership of “Domain Users” in local Administrators (Ransomware loves this).
  • Maintain offline (immutable) backups with weekly restore tests and WORM mode.

2. Removal (basic incident playbook)

  1. Containment FTP/API-Kill script: immediate disable VPN client profile to stop data exfil.
  2. Local forensic triage: Grab triage.zip (MFT, EventLogs, Registry hives, $MFT, AmCache, Prefetch, TaskCache, SRUM).
  3. Isolate infected host from network—disable all NICs/Wi-Fi; keep powered on to retain volatile artefacts.
  4. Terminate malicious services:
  • EncrypSVC (“Windows Privacy Session Manager”)
  • easeupdater.exe (scheduled task EaseUpdate – drops additional PyInstaller payload)
  1. Purge persistence: delete Registry Run keys:
  • HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\easyupdater
  • HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\encrypCrypt
  1. Quarantine the folders:
  • %ProgramData%\servhelper\
  • %LOCALAPPDATA%\mdnms32\
  • %WINDIR%\System32\easeupdater.exe (hash: SHA-256 a7a5e…53ed)
  1. Re-image if feasible; at minimum run reputable AV full scan, then follow up with a second-opinion tool such as Malwarebytes or ESET Online Scanner.
  2. Only after enterprise-triaged IOC hunt returns clean (use YARA rule encryp_23.yar authors released) reconnect to LAN.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Decryption possibility: Currently NO free decryptor exists.
  • The authors generate a random AES-256-CBC key per host, RSA-2048 public key (“key.public” embedded). The private RSA half is kept only on the attacker C2 (enxphpy2h[.]onion/ck.php).
  • .id-[random_string] annotation in the ransom note (HOW_TO_RECOVER_FILES.encryp.txt) is their DB key; it is not an embedded master key.
  • Option for verified victims at present: offline backups; or wait/keep the encrypted data in frozen state in case future research finds a flaw.
  • Critical tools/patches:
  • Kaspersky’s “RakhniDecryptor” (good for older forks like Rakni, but failed against .encryp as of v1.40)
  • Emsisoft’s “NoMoreRansom” checker keeps an up-to-date .encryp entry—bookmark it.
  • If you have Volume Shadow copies (vssadmin list shadows) copy the earliest unencrypted snapshot out (Encryp calls vssadmin delete shadows /all late in execution, so sometimes unencrypted copies remain in first snapshots).
  • For Office365 tenants: ‘Restore your OneDrive’ lets you roll back ≈30-days pre-infection.

4. Other Critical Information / Differentiators

  • No double-extortion leak site yet; attacker email ([email protected]) usage suggests first-tier opportunistic group (payment demand typically 0.036 BTC).
  • Post-explo open-source stack: Python packages (pycryptodome, colorama), compiled to ELF/Win with PyInstaller—this cross-platform toolset hints they may pivot to Linux ESXi hosts next.
  • Network noise: Hard-coded User-Agent “encryp-pkg/10.3” on outbound POST to /ck.php – easy NIDS/Splunk signature.
  • The ransom note (HOW_TO_RECOVER_FILES.encryp.txt) adds “You have network access issues? Go to hxxps://t.me/encrypsupport” – indicates availability of support chat (very atypical for single-campaign locker).
  • Wider Impact: Heavy presence in South-East-Asia manufacturing SMEs plus LATAM municipal sub-departments; at least four known public sector orgs still unavailable >3 weeks because backups were encrypted in later warm-storage tier.
  • Attackers deploy “enableallprivs.ps1” laterally to escalate to SeBackupPrivilege before exfil, so they have tested DR plans and may attack backup software specifically if not protected by immutable storage or MFA.

Key Take-Away

Patch, isolate, and cultivate offline backups first. Unless master RSA private key leaks or researchers find a flaw, Encryp files stay locked; therefore the priority is preventive hygiene plus rapid incident isolation. Keep watching the NoMoreRansom portal—should a decryptor surface, it will appear there first. Stay safe, stay patched.