encrypted*[email protected]*

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Ransomware profile: encrypted*[email protected]*

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmed extension: None – the malware does not append a static suffix.
  • Renaming convention:
    Original name is left intact, but the malware pre-pends the literal string
    encrypted and concatenates the attacker’s e-mail address with asterisks, e.g.
    encrypted*[email protected]*Contract_2024.xlsx
    (Directory-listing screenshot examples all show the e-mail address between two “*” characters.)

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First public submissions: Mid-March 2019 (ID-Ransomware and VirusTotal).
  • Peak distribution waves: April–June 2019 still generating new samples; sporadic re-surge every few months thereafter using the same ransom note header.
  • Continued sightings: 2020-2021 – usually tied to exposed RDP or brute-forced MSP tools.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • RDP / VPS compromise: ~70 % of incidents – attackers brute-force or buy credentials on dark-web markets, laterally move, then manually launch the payload.
  • Phishing with IQY / ISO / RTF attachments: Delivers a PowerShell or JavaScript dropper that downloads the final PE.
  • Exploitation of un-patched public-facing services (old examples):
    – CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue SMBv1) used for lateral movement, although the initial foothold is usually RDP.
    – CVE-2019-0604 (SharePoint) & CVE-2019-11510 (Pulse VPN) observed on a subset of victims that exposed those services.
  • MSP / RMM abuse: ConnectWise/ScreenConnect or Kaseya agents used to push ransomware across client base.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

  • Segment & harden RDP: Use VPN + MFA, set account-lockout, restrict source IPs, change default 3389.
  • Patch externally facing software (SharePoint, Pulse, Fortinet, Citrix etc.).
  • Disable SMBv1 throughout estate; apply MS17-010 (EternalBlue) where it cannot be disabled.
  • Robust mail filtering – block IQY, HTA, JS, ISO at gateway; strip macros by default.
  • Application whitelisting / CSR – stop unsigned PS, HTA, unused interpreters.
  • Credential hygiene: unique local-admin passwords (LAPS), no domain-admin log-on to workstations.
  • Immutable, offline backups (3-2-1 rule) plus periodic restore drill.

2. Removal (step-by-step)

A. Isolate: pull network cable / disable Wi-Fi; power-off unrelated machines.
B. Identify the active sample: look for a recently launched, unsigned EXE in %TEMP%, C:\Users\Public, or run Get-WmiObject Win32_Process; note its path & hash.
C. Collect forensics (optional): memory dump, prefetch, event logs 4688/4624 before reboot.
D. Kill malicious process & persistence: taskkill /IM <name.exe> /F
– Remove Run/RunOnce entries pointing to the same PE.
– Clear any new USER/user-profile credentials or scheduled tasks created by intruder.
E. Delete sample & dropped artifacts (ransom note FILES ENCRYPTED.txt).
F. Scan with reputable AV / EDR to be sure no secondary payloads were left.
G. Patch/harden entry point before reconnecting.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Symmetric key handling: The malware generates a per-file 256-bit AES key; that AES key is RSA-2048-encrypted with a public key embedded in the binary.
    – No flaw has been found in the implementation ⇒ free universal decryptor does NOT exist.
    – Victims who find an un-wiped shadow-copy or accidentally kept a memory dump that contains the per-process BCrypt handle have in rare instances recovered some AES keys, but success is <1 %.
  • Official recommendation: restore from clean, off-line backups; if no backups exist, treat the data as lost unless the organisation is willing to negotiate.
  • Tools: The only utilities considered safe are the paid decryptor delivered by the criminal after (optional) payment and the generic file-repair features of major backup suites.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Attribution: Cluster overlaps with “CommonRansom” / “Ransomware-as-a-Service” family sold on Russian-language forums in early 2019; operators accept谈判 in English & Russian via the same protonmail address.
  • Ransom note contents:
    – File name: FILES ENCRYPTED.txt
    – Reads (in part): “All your data has been locked us. You want to return? write email [email protected].”
    – Demand normally 0.15 – 0.3 BTC for small networks, can escalate to 5–10 BTC for servers.
  • No wiper functionality observed – files can theoretically be decrypted once the RSA private key is supplied, but if the attacker’s key storage is lost (police action, forum exit-scam) decryption becomes impossible.
  • Post breach activity: operators routinely exfiltrate sensitive folders (Finance, HR, customer DB) and threaten to publish them on a clearnet “leak blog” if payment is withheld (“double-extortion”).

Key takeaway:
encrypted*[email protected]* is essentially a RaaS strain circulated since 2019. Because it implements sound RSA+AES cryptography, technical decryption without the criminal’s private RSA key is infeasible. Concentrate on rapid containment, proper eradication, and—most importantly—verified, offline backups to rebuild without funding the adversary.