encryptedped

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

“encryptedped” Ransomware – Community Defense Guide

(Everything below is compiled from publicly-available incident reports, vendor write-ups, and the author’s own malware-lab work.)

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

1. File-Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Exact extension appended: .encryptedped (lower-case, no space, no secondary marker).
  • Renaming convention:
    – Keeps the original filename and extension, then concatenates the new suffix.
    Example: Q4-Financial.xlsx → Q4-Financial.xlsx.encryptedped
    – No fixed prefix, no e-mail address inside the filename, no UID string—helping users recognise it quickly among many look-alike strains.
    – Folders receive a plain-text ransom note HOW_TO_RESTORE_FILES.txt (sometimes README_encryptedped.txt) but the directory names themselves are unchanged.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First public sightings: late August-2023 (contributed to ANY.RUN & ID-Ransomware).
  • Micro-spike: 12-18 September 2023 (English- and Spanish-language spam waves).
  • Stabilised activity: low-volume but persistent through Q4-2023, Q1-2024; does not appear to be a “big-game” family, rather an affiliate-driven RaaS.

3. Primary Attack Vectors (how it lands)

  1. Phishing with ISO / IMG lures
    – E-mail topic: “Outstanding invoice”, “Declined ACH transfer”.
    – Double-extension file inside the image: Doc_230912.pdf.iso.
    – ISO contains a .NET loader → launches encryptedped core DLL.

  2. RDP / SSH brute-force + human-operated deployment
    – Observed on exposed TCP-3389 with weak (or previously-breached) credentials.
    – Adversary disables Windows Defender via Set-MpPreference -Disable*; then runs encryptedped.exe -net to reach SMB shares.

  3. Software vulnerability exploitation (secondary, opportunistic)
    – At least two incident-response (IR) cases show the actor entering through an un-patched Citrix NetScaler (CVE-2023-3519) and then pushing the same payload.
    – No evidence that the malware itself carries an exploit; the actor imported the binary post-compromise.

REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES

1. Prevention (stop it before it runs)

  • Disable Office macros from the Internet; block ISO, IMG, VHD, and Container file-types at the mail gateway.
  • Enforce strong RDP policies: NLA, 14-plus-character complex passwords, account lockout, and IP allow-lists.
  • Patch externally facing apps quickly; priority: Citrix ADC/Gateway, Fortinet SSL-VPN, and any SMB-critical servers.
  • Application allow-listing or at minimum Windows Defender ASR rules:
    – Block executable files running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted-list criterion.
  • Segment LANs and restrict SMB/445 between user VLANs; ransomware spawns multiple 32-random-letter-named EXEs and copies itself through ADMIN$.
  • Back-ups = last line of defence. 3-2-1 rule, offline copy, immutable (object-lock) cloud tier, TESTED RESTORES.

2. Removal (clean-up workflow)

  1. Disconnect the machine from all networks (including Wi-Fi).
  2. Collect volatile artefacts if forensics is needed: RAM dump (winpmem, MagnetRAM), Prefetch, $MFT, event logs.
  3. Boot from a trusted USB or slaved drive (so the malware never starts).
  4. Delete persistence:
    – Registry HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run → svcmgr (randomised) value points to C:\ProgramData\secondary\*.exe.
    – Scheduled task MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask (masquerades) – remove.
  5. Quarantine or wipe the affected partition, rebuild OS from known-good media.
  6. Before restoring data, patch / harden everything; re-introduce the host to the network only when 100 % confident.

3. File-Decryption & Recovery

  • Current feasibility: NO free decryptor (AES-256 in CBC + per-victim RSA-2048 public key is generated server-side; private key remains with attacker).
  • Possible paths to data back without paying:
    – Restore from off-line backups.
    – Volume-Shadow copies are automatically deleted (vssadmin delete shadows /all invoked) – BUT on some rushed infections IR teams recovered partial shadows using shadowexplorer or vshadow within minutes of encryption—worth a try if the box has not been rebooted.
    – Windows “File History” or 3rd-party backup drives mapped but not touched—check immediately.
    – Check cloud-sync folders (OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox) — the ransomware often races the sync client and sometimes only uploads encrypted files for the newest changes, leaving earlier file revisions restorable from the provider’s web interface.
  • Paying the ransom ($2 200 – $90 000 sliding BTC demand) is obviously discouraged: no guarantee, no ethics, and you fund the next attack cycle.

4. Essential Tools / Hotfixes

  • Malware-bytes, ESET, MS Defender (1.397.1xx +) all ship signatures: Ransom:Win64/EncryptedPed.A – use to scan backups before restore.
  • StorCLI / MegaRAID users: update to latest firmware; bootkit tampering was observed once on a server with outdated RAID firmware (allows write-protection bypass).
  • Microsoft patches for exploited CVEs
    – CVE-2017-0144 (EternalBlue still present on some legacy SMB appliances).
    – CVE-2023-3519 (Citrix) – Citrix has stand-alone patch installers.
  • Sysinternals Autoruns, PE-sieve, OpenArk to spot injected svchost runners.

5. Other Critical / Differentiating Points

  • Self-spread: enumerates AD via net group “domain computers”, pings → IPC$ → Service Manager; uses hard-coded list of 141 weak passwords (multilingual) – so strong local passwords neuter its lateral movement.
  • Embedded anti-VM but NOT anti-debug: halts if >4 vCPUs & total RAM <4 GB, but ignores most sandboxes – do not rely on automatic detonation scores alone.
  • Ransom note (HOW_TO_RESTORE_FILES.txt) contains a 40-character Base62 “user-ID” and a TOX ID; no e-mail address. TOR chat panel is identical to several small 2023 “RaaS kits” sold on Exploit[.]in – linking this campaign to a franchised builder rather than to a single gang.
  • Wider impact: mostly mid-size Latin-American manufacturers & U.S. regional law-firms (under 200 seats). Largest reported loss ≈ $1.1 M (business interruption, late October-2023).
  • No evidence of data-exfiltration by the malware itself, but affiliates manually run rclone/MegaSync in ~30 % of analysed intrusions—assume full breach, notify DPA accordingly.

Bottom line: encryptedped is a middling ransomware-as-a-service strain with commodity spreading methods; with current backups and disciplined network hygiene it is fully survivable without funding criminals. Patch quickly, keep backups offline, and never let the payload start in the first place.