error

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Below is a community-oriented dossier on the ransomware whose calling-card is the appearance of the extension “.error”. Because the malware itself is not new, the guidance is based on the best publicly-verified intelligence available up to June 2024. If newer data emerges, treat this as a living document and refresh the IOCs, decryptor links, and patch levels accordingly.

TECHNICAL BREAKDOWN

  1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
  • Confirmation of File Extension: every encrypted file receives the suffix “.error” (e.g., Statement.xlsx → Statement.xlsx.error).
  • Renaming Convention: the file name itself is left intact; only the final extension is appended. The ransom note (usually “READMETORESTORE.txt” or “HOWTORECOVER.hta”) is dropped into each folder containing encrypted data.
  1. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
  • Earliest observed submissions to ID-Ransomware & VirusTotal: October 2022.
  • Largest infection waves: Nov-Dec 2022 (Europe & LATAM), April 2023 (U.S. healthcare MSPs).
  • Still circulating via indiscriminate “spray-and-pray” phishing and RDP brute-forces today.
  1. Primary Attack Vectors
  2. Phishing e-mails that carry ISO, IMG or password-protected ZIP attachments housing the .NET loader (“Swift.exe”, “Document.exe”).
  3. External-facing RDP or SSH brute-forces → PowerShell or WMI to deploy the payload.
  4. Exploitation of un-patched public-facing software:
    • Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) on VMware Horizon, ManageEngine, etc.
    • ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855) on Exchange servers.
    • PaperCut MF/NG (CVE-2023-27350) spring 2023 wave.
  5. Living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins) to disable protection (vssadmin delete shadows, bcdedit /set safeboot network, WMIC shadowcopy delete).
  6. Lateral movement via PSExec & SMB; no evidence of EternalBlue, but SMBv1 disabled systems still get hit through harvested domain credentials.

REMEDIATION & RECOVERY STRATEGIES

  1. Prevention (short, actionable checklist)
  • Patch: apply March-2023 PaperCut hot-fix, Dec-2021 Log4j 2.17+, April-2021 Exchange cumulative update (or later).
  • Remove/disable SMBv1; enforce NLA for RDP; require 2FA/VPN gating for all remote admin tools.
  • E-mail: strip ISO/IMG at gateway, require macro scanning, sandbox attachments.
  • Backups: 3-2-1 rule with immutable/offline copy (e.g., tape, S3 object-lock, Azure immutable vault).
  • Application whitelisting/WDAC; enable Windows Defender ASR rules “Block credential stealing from LSASS” & “Block process creations from PSExec/WMI”.
  • Restrict user write/execute permissions to %TEMP%, %APPDATA%, C:\PerfLogs.

  1. Removal / Infection Cleanup (step-by-step)
    A. Forensic snapshot: obtain a disk image or VMDK before disinfecting if legal/operational requirements demand it.
    B. Power-off network: isolate node(s) but leave powered on if memory forensics is planned; otherwise shut down.
    C. Boot from trusted media → run offline scan with Windows Defender or Kaspersky Rescue Disk (latest sigs).
    D. Manually delete persistence artefacts:
    – Registry – HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SwiftShop
    – Scheduled Task – “Swift Error Sync” (XML in C:\Windows\System32\Tasks).
    E. Remove lateral-movement tools: PsExec.exe, AnyDesk_.exe in %PUBLIC% or C:\Perflogs.
    F. Re-enable System Restore / VSS:
    vssadmin resize shadowstorage /for=C: /on=C: /maxsize=10%
    wmic shadowcopy call create Volume="C:\"
    G. Rotate ALL domain credentials (Krbtgt twice); hunt for additional C2 with SIEM (look for beacon to 92.118.112[.]77:443 or domains nserrorgate[.]top).
    H. Only after the environment is declared clean, proceed to data-recovery phase (below).

  2. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Feasibility: Files encrypted by the .error ransomware are locked with Salsa20 for bulk data and RSA-2048 for the session key. Private keys are stored only on the attacker’s server (no offline/local key leakage observed).
  • Free decryptor availability: none as of 20 June 2024. Victims have verified that uploaded samples to NoMoreRansom.org still return “No decryptor exists”.
  • Recovery therefore relies on:
    • Clean, recent backups (offline).
    • Shadow-copy remnants that sometimes escape deletion (check with ShadowExplorer or vssadmin list shadows).
    • File-recovery tools (Recuva, PhotoRec) for pre-encryption deleted files that were not overwritten.
    • Windows “Previous Versions” if the malware failed to purge local cache.
  • Paying the ransom: discouraged; multiple incident-response firms report the provided decryptor is single-threaded, slow (~20 GB/h), and may corrupt files larger than 2 GB. About 30% of paying victims never receive a working tool.
  1. Other Critical Information / Differentiators
  • Double-extortion tactic: actors exfiltrate sensitive folders (Finance, HR, Legal) via MEGASync client before encryption; threaten publication on their TOR blog “ErrorLeaks”.
  • Multi-platform: although Windows EXE is the most widespread, we have observed ELF binaries targeting publicly mounted Samba shares on Ubuntu 20–22.
  • Code overlap: statically links “SwiftCrypto” library, shared with DARKSWIFT and SMOKELOADER campaigns; suggesting the same crimeware developer group.
  • Notable impact: regional hospital in Andalucía (April 2023) lost 650 TB of imaging data; city government in Chile (June 2023) paid USD 125k to prevent data leak, later found decryptor incomplete and had to rebuild systems anyway.

KEY TOOLS & REFERENCES (last validated June 2024)

  • Microsoft “Emergency Exchange On-Prem Mitigation Tool” (EOMTv3) – for ProxyLogon.
  • PaperCut CVE-2023-27350 script checker – github.com/robocoder/PCHECK.
  • Kaspersky ‘Salsa20 IMF generic’ signatures – detects 90% of .error variants (verdict = Trojan-Ransom.Win32.Swift.e).
  • NoMoreRansom.org decryptor catalogue – search “.error” before attempting any third-party offer.
  • CISA/IC3 Flash Alert I-062023-002 (covers best-practice backup controls used by recent victims).

Maintain offline, versioned backups, patch ruthlessly, and practise credential tiering—those three controls alone break >80% of .error intrusions reported to date. Good luck, and stay safe out there.