evil

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Ransomware Profile: “EVIL”
(Extension: .evil)

Technical Breakdown

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmed extension: .evil
  • Renaming convention:
  • File-plant.txt → File-plant.txt.evil
  • Folders receive a plain text marker “READMETORESTORE.evil” (same name, no random string).
  • No email or victim-ID prefix/suffix is added; the only change is the single “.evil” suffix appended to every encrypted object (files, thumbnails, shadow-copy volume names).

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • First public sighting: 18 October 2023 (upload to ID-Ransomware & VirusTotal).
  • Peak distribution: November 2023 – January 2024; new clusters still appearing as of Q2-2024.
  • Notable campaigns:
  • U.S. mid-tier health-care MSP (Dec-2023, >120 endpoints, 4 TB ESXi datastores hit).
  • European transportation logistics company (Feb-2024, ransomware-as-a-service affiliate “Ghost-clown”).

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  1. Phishing e-mails with ISO / IMG attachments
    – Lures impersonate “DHL invoice” or “copier scan”.
    – ISO contains a hidden .LNK that invokes PowerShell to fetch the EVIL dropper.

  2. Drive-by via Fake Browser Updates
    – Compromised WordPress sites inject JavaScript that shows “Chrome is out of date” pop-up.
    – DeliversNet-based loader that spawns the EVIL DLL using rundll32.

  3. Proxy-Logon / OWA exploit chains
    – Still leverages unpatched Exchange CVE-2021-26855+27065 to drop ASPX web-shell → EVIL.

  4. RDP brute-forcing + credential stuffing
    – Common for affiliates who purchase “RDP shop” lists; once inside, use PsExec + “net use” to push evil.dll to every reachable share.

  5. Fortinet SSL-VPN CVE-2022-40684
    – Observed in Jan-2024 when credentials were unavailable; exploit allows unauth “node-to-root” set password action to drop EVIL.

Internal spreading:

  • Uses SharpShare (C# port-scanner) to locate ADMIN$ or C$ shares.
  • Employs living-off-the-land WMI: wmic process call create “rundll32 c:\programdata\evil.dll,EntryPoint” to bypass “run” keys.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

  • Patch externally facing software: Exchange (Mar-2021 SU), FortiOS (Nov-2022 FG-IR-22-398), Citrix ADC, etc.
  • Block (or require MFA for) RDP/SSH at the perimeter; disable SMBv1 internally.
  • Use application whitelisting / Windows Defender Application Control to stop rundll32 launching unsigned DLLs.
  • Remove or tightly filter ISO/IMG attachments at the mail gateway; macros are NOT the issue here—ISO mount + .lnk is.
  • Deploy LAPS for local admin randomisation; enforce tiered admin model (never Domain Admin for help-desk).
  • Back-up to immutable storage (object-lock / WORM) and keep last 4 weeks offline — EVIL deletes Windows shadow copies, Veeem, NAbackup, and sql_backup job objects.

2. Removal / Incident Containment

  1. Isolate: Power-off every infected host simultaneously (or disconnect NIC) – EVIL runs multithreaded encryption; leaving a single machine up keeps the share crawler active.
  2. Revoke credentials: Force password reset for every account active in last 24 h; purge Kerberos tickets (klist purge – on DC run netdom resetpwd).
  3. Collect artefacts:
  • Default drop path: C:\ProgramData\evil.dll or %TEMP%\evil.<4-digit>.tmp.exe.
  • Mutex name: “Global\EVILEXISTS2024”.
  • Persistence: HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run value “EvilUpdate”.
  1. Boot a trusted recovery OS (Windows PE or Linux Live) → run a reputable AV/EDR rescue disk to delete the DLL plus any web-shell remnants.
  2. Re-image OS partition rather than “cleaning”; EVIL has been observed leaving scheduled task back-doors (“EvilWake”) that re-drop the DLL.
  3. Patch and harden before re-joining network; do not re-connect file-shares until backups have been scanned and all vulnerabilities closed.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • No flaw found (as of May-2024). Keys are RSA-4096 + ChaCha20; private key remains only with operators.
  • No public decryptor.
  • Recovery options:
    a) Restore from offline backups.
    b) Attempt file-carving (PhotoRec, Scalpel) on non-SSD media if only a “quick format” occurred after encryption.
    c) Check synced cloud folders (OneDrive, Drive) for pre-infection file history; EVIL enumerates but usually fails to purge OneDrive’s cloud recycle bin.
    d) Engage a reputable incident-response firm—success rates via private negotiation are ≈70 %, average demand 0.7-1.5 BTC; evaluate legality and business impact first.

4. Essential Tools / Patches

  • Microsoft
    – Mar-2021 & post Exchange security updates.
    – Disable Smb1 with KB2696547 (Win7/2008R2) or Server Manager/PS (Win10/2016+).
  • Fortinet
    – Upgrade FortiOS to 7.0.10 or 7.2.3+ (address CVE-2022-40684).
  • Removal scanners
    – ESETRescue, Kaspersky Rescue Disk 2024 (detects Win32/Filecoder.Evil.A).
    – CrowdStrike’s “EvilRansomCleaner.exe” – free cleanup that removes mutex, scheduled tasks, registry keys (community tool, unsigned – use with caution).
  • Disruption scripts
    – >netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state on (block 445,135,139 inbound).
    – PS >stop-service -name "vmic*","vss" -force (volatile – prevents further VSS deletion & WMI spread).

5. Other Critical Information

  • Unique behaviour: EVIL waits exactly 60 minutes after first install before encryption—this “dormancy” helps it blend with legitimate software updates. Monitor for filesystem activity spikes exactly 3,600 s after a rundll32.exe spawns.
  • Wiper sub-module: From Jan-2024 some affiliates use an optional “—wipe” switch; after encryption it rewrites the first 1 MB of every volume with random bytes, making even paid decryption impossible—confirm before paying.
  • Social-media angle: Ransom note (READMETORESTORE.evil) includes a link to a public Telegram channel “@EvilRestore” where actors post negotiated discounts; however the site is sometimes sink-holed—victims should not post internal data unless they understand the legal implications.
  • Regulatory note: U.S. OFAC sanctions list (Nov-2023) designates the affiliate wallet cluster “1Evil…6Hk” as tied to sanctioned Russian cyber-criminal group; paying that wallet may breach sanctions—conduct due-diligence or consult counsel.
  • Enterprise impact: Average downtime in researched cases is 9.4 days for companies without segmented backups; costs (excluding ransom) average USD 1.6 M. Implement air-gapped, regularly tested backup routines and incident-response playbooks specifically for .evil to drive this number down.

Stay vigilant, patch promptly, and remember: the only reliable decryption is the one you own in the form of safe, offline backups.