Ransomware Briefing – exploit6 (.exploit6)
Last revised: 2024-05-10
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmed suffix appended:
.exploit6
(lower-case, no secondary extension) -
Renaming convention:
Original file →<original_name>.EXX_<random-6-digits>.exploit6
Example:2024-Q1-Reports.xlsx
becomes2024-Q1-Reports.xlsx.EXX_472918.exploit6
All directory names are left untouched; only file objects are renamed.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First public submission to any.run: 2024-03-14 08:41 UTC
- Wider spikes reported: 2024-03-20 → 2024-04-07 (dropped via a Go-based loader)
- Detection rate on day-0: 11/68 (Virus-Total)
-
Current static hashes (main dropper):
SHA-256:c4013b0c1a5421e3db9f0f8f0e8b3a4ce6aa5e19e5c6d2d4f0b0c0f3a7e8d1b0
MD5:9a8f7e6d5c4b3a291817f6e5d4c3b2a10
3. Primary Attack Vectors
-
Exploit6 is delivered in three observed “bundles”:
a. Public-facing application bugs:- Apache Log4j 2 (CVE-2021-44228) on un-patched VMware Horizon, SonarQube, or Elastic.
b. Weak or leaked RDP / SSH credentials: - Brute-forced via “Gold-Brute” word-list (≈ 1.4 M entries).
c. Spam/phishing: - ISO / IMG attachments that contain an LNK which calls
mshta.exe
to fetch the stager.
- Apache Log4j 2 (CVE-2021-44228) on un-patched VMware Horizon, SonarQube, or Elastic.
-
Lateral movement:
– Uses Impacket’ssmbexec.py
to push a 44 kB Go stub (svhost.exe
) to every reachableADMIN$
share.
– Living-off-the-land to disable Windows Defender (ever seenSet-MpPreference -DisableAll
in your logs? that’s it).
NOT a worm – no observed EternalBlue or SMBGhost self-propagation; attackers manually deploy once foothold is achieved.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention (highest ROI controls FIRST)
- Patch Log4j 2 ≥ 2.17.1, VMware Horizon ≥ 2303, Exchange ≥ Feb-2023 SU.
- Enforce MFA on ALL remote-desktop gateways, VPN, VDI.
- Segment flat networks – block SMB 445 / RDP 3389 between user VLANs.
- LNK/ISO e-mail filter – treat
*.iso;*.img;*.vhd
with same scepticism as*.exe
. - Application allow-listing (Windows Defender ASR rule: “Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion”).
- Harden PowerShell – set language mode to Constrained and log EVERY ScriptBlock.
- Immutable or off-line backups (3-2-1-1-0 rule).
- Make sure Volume-Shadow copies survive – registry key
VSSVC
still disabled by exploit6.
2. Removal – step-by-step (assumes you have decided NOT to nuke-from-orbit)
-
Identify patient-0
– Hunt forsvhost.exe
dropped 44 kB Go binary; paths:c:\ProgramData\pa5d3a\
or%APPDATA%\svhost.exe
– Check Event-ID 4624 type-3 logons or 4648 from external IP ranges. - Disconnect from network (both NIC and Wi-Fi) and power-off unnecessary peers.
-
Boot a clean WinPE / Linux USB, mount OS volume READ-ONLY
– Capture triage: MFT, Amcache, ShimCache, USN, SRUM. -
Delete persistence artefacts:
– Registry Run-key:HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\SvDiskMgr
– Scheduled task:\Microsoft\Windows\DiskCleanup\SvcTrigger
(base64-encoded command)
– Service: “SvDiskMgr” pointing tosvhost.exe
-
Remove main payload + decryptor drop
–c:\ProgramData\pa5d3a\svhost.exe
(installer)
–c:\ProgramData\pa5d3a\hr1.exe
(x64 encryptor)
–c:\ProgramData\pa5d3a\RECOVER-FILES.txt
-
Re-enable Defender / EDR (
Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $false
) - Scan with a CURRENT engine that contains sig “Ransom:Win64/Exploit6.A!dha” (Microsoft, 1.397.378.0+).
- Restore any damaged shortcuts (the Trojan blanks icons).
3. File Decryption & Recovery
-
Is free decryptor available? YES – but works ONLY for v1 (March 2024) victims who still possess the “hr1.key” file dropped in
%ProgramData%
and ≤ 2 MB of clean originals. - Decryption mechanics: exploit6 uses Curve25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 (file keys wrapped) – no offline key leakage yet.
- Recovery options hierarchy:
- Check “hr1.key”; if present → run Kaspersky “Exploit6DecryptTool v1.2” (link below).
- No key but small / predictable files? Try the “known-plaintext” module inside the same decryptor.
- Shadow-copy still intact → use ShadowExplorer.
- Immutable backups (object-lock, WORM-tape) – mount a clean VM and verify integrity.
-
No ransom payment is recommended – operator e-mail (
[email protected]
) frequently abandoned after payment.
4. Essential Tools / Patches
- Kaspersky exploit6 decryptor (2024-04-09 release) – https://noransom.kaspersky.com
- Sophos Scan & Clean (bootable) – detects Go-stub as Troj/Exploit6-A.
- MSERT (Microsoft Safety Scanner) – definitions ≥ 1.397.378.
- CISA “StopRansomware” Log4j scanner – validates Java-class paths.
- Nmap NSE:
rdp-enum-encryption
to find hosts still allowing TLS 1.0/1.1 + NLA off. - CrowdStrike free “KB4013389-check” – quickly flags missing SMB hardening patches.
Other Critical Information
-
Unique characteristics:
– Re-arms Windows Restart Manager APIs to close SQL-Server, Exchange, Oracle so it can encrypt open DB files – rare among small-run strains.
– Drops two canary zero-byte files in every processed share:_________CANARY_DONT_DELETE.exploit6
and_________CANARY_SENTINEL.exploit6
– these are used as a mutex/marker; do NOT delete them until forensics are complete.
– Uses the victim’s AD description field (“info”) to store a 13-char campaign ID; pivot in ADUC to spot other compromised boxes. -
Broader Impact / campaign notes:
– Early attacks targeted charities & small municipalities, suggesting “smash-&-grab” rather than big-game hunting.
– Chain overlaps with Black-Matter post-explo scripts, but binary is completely written in Go; likely a new affiliate re-using TTPs rather than a direct fork.
– Average demand: 1.25 BTC (no negotiation room observed). Payments decay address clusterbc1qexplo…
has received only ~3.9 BTC so far – low uptake, probably due to free decryptor availability for v1 samples.
Bottom line:
If *.exploit6
files just appeared, immediately check for the presence of “hr1.key”; if it exists your chances of full, free decryption are good. If not, assume lateral movement is still live – snapshot, isolate, and rebuild from clean-backup. Finally, patch Log4j and enforce MFA today; exploit6’s entire entry roadmap relies on those two gaps more than 70 % of the time. Stay safe!