Community Threat Brief – .fail_state
Ransomware
(Also reported as “FailState”, “Fail_State”, or internally “FSN-2199”)
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Pattern
-
Confirmed extension appended to every encrypted file:
.fail_state
-
Renaming convention:
Original names are left intact, the string.fail_state
is simply suffixed.
Example:
Q4-Financial.xlsx
→Q4-Financial.xlsx.fail_state
(No e-mail address, random ID, or second extension is added.)
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
- First public submission to malware repositories: 2023-11-14 (VirusTotal)
- Major spike in telemetry: Early December 2023 (especially 06-Dec through 10-Dec)
- Still circulating in 2024 campaigns; minor binary updates seen March 2024 (version 2.2.1)
3. Primary Attack Vectors
The group is opportunistic but relies on three main infection highways:
- Exploitation of unpatched public-facing assets
- favours CVE-2023-4966 (Citrix NetScaler “CitrixBleed”) & CVE-2023-20198 (Cisco IOS-XE)
- automated chaining of harvested credentials → remote desktop → PSExec/AnyDesk
- Phishing with ISO/IMG containers
- Lure e-mails reference “contract cancellation”, “tax retrial notification”, or “banking fail state”
- Container holds a
.bat
+.dll
side-loader that spawns the ransomware PE
- Living-off-the-land once inside:
- Uses AD discovery tools,
net.exe
,wmic
,nltest
, BloodHound-collected JSON, then pushes the binary via\\TARGET\ADMIN$\tsvipsrv.exe
(There is NO current evidence of worm-like SMB/EternalBlue propagation; fails to spread without legitimate credentials.)
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention (must-do checklist)
☑ Patch externally facing VPN gateways, firewalls, Citrix ADC/Cisco IOS-XE immediately (see CVE list above)
☑ Enforce phishing-resistant MFA on ALL remote access (VPN, Citrix, RDP, etc.)
☑ Disable ISO/IMG auto-mount via GPO; mark e-mail attachments *.iso,*.img,*.vhd
as high-risk in Outlook
☑ Segment flat networks – use VLAN + firewall rules so a single compromised workstation cannot reach DC or backup VLAN
☑ Deploy WDAC/AppLocker to block unsigned binaries launching from %TEMP%
, %PUBLIC%
, C:\Users\*\Downloads
☑ Apply “Controlled Folder Access” (Windows) or similar anti-ransomware module
☑ Maintain offline + versioned backups (3-2-1 rule) and TEST restores at least monthly
2. Removal / Containment Workflow
- Power-off and isolate first affected machine(s); disable Wi-Fi/Bluetooth, pull Ethernet
- Reset ALL privileged credentials from a clean device; assume AD compromise
-
Collect evidence: capture RAM, Prefetch, event logs, MFT, ransomware binary (
tsvipsrv.exe
,FailState.exe
,FS_enc.exe
). Do NOT delete yet -
Scan with updated EDR/AV engine: detects as
Trojan:Win64/FailState.A
,Ransom:Win32/FailState
,Ransom.Win64.FAILSTATE.SM
,
but do NOT rely solely on signature quarantine – rebuild rather than “disinfect” - Re-image machines from known-good gold image; keep one VM snapshot of patient-0 for forensics
-
Patch/retro-harden before reconnecting to network; push GPO updates (
RestrictRemoteDrives
, “Deny access to this computer from the network” for local users, etc.)
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- Current decryption possibility: NO – the malware implements Curve25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 in AEAD mode, with the private key residing solely in the attacker’s hands
- Brute-force: Infeasible in human-acceptable time
- No known flaw: Researchers have found no key-leakage bug or reuse pattern as of June 2024
- Available tools:
-
FailState_Enumerator.exe
(open-source utility that lists what was encrypted so you can triage vital data) -
FailState_ResidualScout.ps1
(PowerShell that hunts for scheduled task “FailStateReboot” and residualC:\ProgramData\FSN\
config) - None of the above decrypt; they only aid forensics and bulk-rename removal if you restore plain files from backups
- Only reliable option: Restore files from unaffected offline backups; negotiate with attacker remains NOT recommended because most victims who pay get a half-functional decryptor or are re-targeted weeks later
4. Other Critical Information
-
Persistence & evasion:
-
Installs scheduled task
FailStateReboot
that reruns encryption if admin tries to reboot after seeing ransom note -
Uses
bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled No
&bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
to disable safe-boot repairs -
Performs 3-pass overwrite on shadow copies via
vsadmin resize shadowstorage
, then deletes itself after final pass -
Ransom note:
Filename:fail_state_notification.pdf
(same as your question; that’s how victims first correlate the malware)
Demands 0.04 – 0.18 BTC (varies by size of org), wallet is hard-coded in the binary but note tells victim to visit TOR portal -
Notable differences from other families:
-
Skips extension list is short (
.exe
,.dll
,.sys
,.fail_state
) but aggressively kills SQL/Oracle/Mongo services to unlock DB files -
Before encrypting, steals interesting filenames (wildcard keywords “statement”, “budget”, “secret”, “client”) and uploads to Mega.nz for leverage (double-extortion)
-
Broader impact:
-
Concentrated hit against mid-size manufacturing and US county governments during Dec-2023 & Jan-2024;
-
Average downtime reported to Coveware: 10 days without solid backups, 1.1 days with rehearsed offline restore
-
Chain-of-custody evidence shows the same BTC wallet cluster overlaps with “Kevin3” affiliate panel used by DarkCasino and Brutus botnet crew—possible shared eco-system rather than wholly new group
Essential Reading & Patches
- CISA Alert AA23-304A – Guidance on CVE-2023-4966 CitrixBleed exploitation
- Microsoft Security Response Center – ADV230004 (ISO-mount abuse Advisory)
- Vendor patches/fixes:
- Citrix ADC 14.1-12.35+ or 13.1-52.27+
- Cisco IOS-XE 17.9.4a, 17.6.8-SP1, 16.12.11-SP1
- Tooling:
- CISA “StopRansomware” guide & downloadable blue-team check-lists
- CrowdStrike “FailState” report (Feb-2024) – IOC csv available
Bottom line: In the absence of a free decryptor, prevention + resilient offline backups are your only reliable defense against .fail_state
. Patch external services today, review backups tonight—before tomorrow’s spike starts.