Ransomware Report – “Fancyleaks”
(File extension observed in the wild: .fancyleaks)
Technical Breakdown
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension:
.fancyleaks
(lower-case) is appended to every encrypted file. -
Renaming Convention:
<original-file-name>.<original-extension>.id-<user-ID>.[<attacker-email(es)>].fancyleaks
Example:
Project_Q3.xlsx → Project_Q3.xlsx.id-A87F4B42.[[email protected]].fancyleaks
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
-
First public submission: 2023-02-14 (MalwareBazaar hash
be9e…c1b4
). - Wider distribution spike: March–April 2023 (tracked by ID-Ransomware & Twitter infosec feeds).
3. Primary Attack Vectors
- Phishing with ISO / IMG lures containing a hidden .NET loader (disguised as “Invoice-7632.iso”).
- Exploitation of public-facing RDP protected only by weak or previously-stolen credentials; attackers then manually drop the payload.
-
Software vulnerability chain:
– Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) on un-patched VMware Horizon.
– PaperCut NG/MF (CVE-2023-27350) for lateral movement inside print-server segments. -
Living-off-the-land: uses
wmic
+PowerShell
to delete shadow copies (vssadmin delete shadows /all
). - No built-in worm module (unlike WannaCry); propagation is post-breach, via PsExec & RDP.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies
1. Prevention
- Eliminate direct RDP exposure; enforce VPN + MFA.
- Patch externally-facing apps (Log4j, PaperCut, Citrix, Fortinet, etc.).
- Disable ISO/IMG auto-mount via GPO; train users to open Office macros only from trusted locations.
- Application allow-listing (e.g., Microsoft Defender Application Control) blocks the .NET loader.
- Protect backups: offline, immutable, or S3 with Object-Lock + MFA-delete; test monthly restores.
2. Removal
- Isolate infected machine from network (pull cable / disable Wi-Fi).
- Boot into Safe Mode with Networking or use Windows PE.
- Collect an image for forensics if compliance requires it, otherwise proceed with wipe.
-
Use a reputable offline scanner (Kaspersky Rescue Disk, ESET SysRescue, Windows Defender Offline). The main payload is usually dropped in:
%LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\svhost.exe
orC:\PerfLogs\svhost.exe
(note the missing “c”). - Delete scheduled tasks “Windows Update Check” & “Windows Update Log” installed by the dropper.
- Clean registry Run/RunOnce keys referencing the above paths.
-
Reboot normally; confirm
svhost.exe
is no longer spawned.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
-
Recovery Feasibility: As of June-2024, NO free decryptor exists. Fancyleaks uses a secure hybrid scheme (
RSA-2048
+ChaCha20
) – private key remains only on the attackers’ server. -
Brute-force / Shadow-explorer is ineffective because:
– Shadow copies are purged.
– Local RSA key is generated per victim but encrypted with the operators’ master public key. - Victims must rely on: offline/cloud backups, Volume-Shadow copies that escaped deletion (rare), or commercial negotiation/paying the ransom (not recommended & no guarantee).
- No publicly leaked master key has surfaced (compare to “Babuk” or “Conti-leak”).
4. Other Critical Information
-
Unique characteristics:
– The ransom note (“README_TO_RESTORE.txt
”) contains “Fancy Leaks Team” ASCII art and quotes the US Declaration of Independence.
– Operators run a clearnet “victim blog” (currentlyfancyleaksblog[.]com
) and threaten to publish 5 % of exfiltrated data immediately if the victim refuses to contact them within 72 h.
– Uses “StealBit 2.0” commodity stealer to exfiltrate only files < 100 MB in an attempt to minimise upload time and defender telemetry. -
Broader impact:
– Mainly targets mid-size manufacturing and legal firms in North America & Western Europe.
– Average demanded ransom: 1.3 BTC (≈ US $35 k – 45 k).
– Because of concurrent data theft, companies face dual extortion: encrypted production + public release of IP/contracts.
Quick-reference checklist for sysadmins
- [ ] Block outbound
tor2web
&onion.ly
traffic; fancyleaks negotiation portal is hidden-service only. - [ ] Deploy Microsoft update KB5022282 (Jan-2023) or newer – closes the PaperCut vector.
- [ ] Disable macro execution from Office files originating from the Internet via GPO.
- [ ] Validate that backup jobs are NOT using network-mapped drives (they’re enumerated and encrypted).
- [ ] Log PowerShell command-line auditing; look for
cha20_encrypt
,-RSACryptoServiceProvider
, &.fancyleaks
.
Bottom line: Treat Fancyleaks like any modern double-extortion group – assume data has been stolen, do NOT pay, rebuild from clean media after patching, and restore immutable backups instead.