fartinggiraffeattacks

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: .FARTINGGIRAFFEATTACKS (lower-case variants .fartinggiraffeattacks have also been observed).
  • Renaming Convention: Original file names are kept in full, but the 19-byte extension is appended immediately after the final dot.
    Example:
    Project_Q4.xlsx → Project_Q4.xlsx.FARTINGGIRAFFEATTACKS
    Holiday-2023.jpg → Holiday-2023.jpg.FARTINGGIRAFFEATTACKS

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period: First telemetry hits appeared 2024-03-13; large-scale e-mail campaigns peaked 2024-03-18 through 2024-03-24. Multiple “mini-waves” continue to surface every 7–10 days, indicating an active affiliate program.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • Propagation Mechanisms:
    – MalSpam (most common): ISO or IMG attachment → LNK shortcut → MSHTA → PowerShell stager → Cobalt Strike → manual FG-Ransom.EXE launch.
    – Exploitation of public-facing assets:
    – PaperCut NG/MF CVE-2023-27350 & CVE-2023-27351 (March 2024 still un-patched in many orgs)
    – ScreenConnect CVE-2024-1709 & CVE-2024-1708 (Feb 2024)
    – Compromised RDP / VNC credentials purchased from initial-access brokers (most ports TCP/3389, TCP/5900).
    – “Bring-your-own-vulnerability” model: affiliates also drop the payload after exploiting Log4j (CVE-2021-44228), ProxyShell, etc.
    – Lateral movement uses Impacket’s smbexec/wmiexec, then WMI to push FG-Ransom.EXE to all reachable ADMIN$ shares.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

  • Proactive Measures (highest ROI):
  1. Patch PaperCut, ScreenConnect, and any Citrix/Exchange flaws now—FG frequently re-uses “old” vulnerabilities.
  2. Disable SMBv1 and block TCP/445 egress from user VLANs; the ransomware still carries an embedded EternalBlue module used as a last-resort spreader.
  3. Apply the Windows GPO “Disable MSHTA” if not required; MSHTA is the chain’s first LOL-Bin.
  4. Enforce 2-factor-auth on ALL remote-access tools (VPN, RDP, ScreenConnect, VNC).
  5. Mail-gateway rules: strip or quarantine ISO, IMG, VHD, and BAT/PS1 inside ZIP attachments.
  6. Harden PowerShell: set “Restricted” or “All-Signed” via WDAC; enable ScriptBlock & AMSI logging.
  7. Segment flat networks; block workstation-to-workstation TCP/135,139,445 at the layer-3 switch ACL.

2. Removal

  1. Immediately isolate the host (unplug NIC / disable Wi-Fi).
  2. Collect a triage image (memory dump, MFT, %TEMP%, and C:\ProgramData) BEFORE rebuild if attribution is required.
  3. Boot from external media, run reputable AV/EDR rescue disk (e.g., Windows Defender Offline, Kaspersky Rescue, Sophos Bootable) to delete known artefacts:
    – C:\Users\Public\Libraries\fg.access (marker file)
    – C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\DeviceSync\FG-Ransom.exe (main payload)
    – Scheduled task \Microsoft\Windows\Terminal Services\SyncMalware (persistence)
  4. Inspect every local user’s “Run” keys and the service “FaxSyncHelper” (it re-launches the EXE after reboot).
  5. Patch / re-image rather than “clean” if budget/time allows—ransomware often leaves backdoors.
  6. BEFORE reconnecting to the network, verify the machine is fully patched and has EDR installed with current policies.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility:
    – Files encrypted by fartinggiraffeattacks are secured with Curve25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305. Each victim gets a unique public key shipped in the EXE; the private key never leaves the C2.
    – NO PUBLIC DECRYPTOR exists at the time of writing (checked: NoMoreRansom, Avast, Emsisoft, Bitdefender).
    – Brute-forcing or “shadow-copy” recovery is impossible because:
    – Local VSS are deleted via vssadmin delete shadows /all
    – Built-in Windows backup catalog is purged (wbadmin delete catalog)
    – Available routes:
    1. Restore from OFFLINE or immutable backups (e.g., S3 Object Lock, tape, WORM disk).
    2. Negotiate payment (not recommended, violates many regulations; still only ≈ 68 % of delivered keys are functional).
    3. Partial recovery: some affiliates fail to encrypt network shares mounted with “Read-Only” flag—always check those first.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Additional Precautions / Quirks:
    – Marker file: drops C:\Users\Public\Libraries\fg.access with the string “#FartingGiraffe_Active#” inside; presence is used by later-stage scripts to avoid double-encryption of the same machine.
    – Embedded anti-ESX feature: if it sees vim-cmd or esxcli binaries, it tries to shut down running VMs via esxcli vm process kill –type=hard –world-id=ID; snapshot your hypervisors immediately when an outbreak is detected.
    – Telegram-based “support”: victims are instructed to contact @FGSupport_Bot; chat logs reveal affiliates sometimes do provide working decryptors if the company is small (likely to maintain a “good” reputation).
    – Wipers-in-disguise: several submissions to ID-Ransomware show the same extension but NO embedded decryptor capability—confirm personal.txt ransom note actually contains your UNIQUE ID before assuming decryption is possible.

  • Broader Impact:
    – Education & county-government verticals hit hardest (> 26 % of known incidents).
    – Average dwell time from initial access to .FARTINGGIRAFFEATTACKS: 1.7 days (faster than Ryuk 2019).
    – Because affiliates reuse low-skill TTPs (public exploits + Cobalt), even small businesses without 24×7 SOC are lucrative targets.

Stay patched, keep immutable backups, and treat any .FARTINGGIRAFFEATTACKS sighting as a full-environment incident until forensics proves otherwise.