find0m

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

Technical Breakdown for find0m Ransomware

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: Encrypted files are re-suffixed with “.find0m”.
  • Renaming Convention: <original_name>.find0m (no e-mail, ID string, or random bytes are inserted). Older variants occasionally append the victim UID as a second extension (e.g., document.pdf.id-A1B2C3.find0m), but current samples keep only “.find0m”.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period: First public submission to VirusTotal late-January 2024; large-scale e-mail campaigns observed mid-February 2024 and secondary spike May-2024. Most detections continue to concentrate in North & South America, Germany, and India.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

  • Phishing e-mails with JavaScript or ISO attachments (“pending invoice”, “parcel tracking”, “voice-message”, “FedEx/UPS/PayPal” lures).
  • Exploitation of public-facing RDP protected only by weak or re-used passwords; port 3389 brute-force followed by manual drop of the find0m PE.
  • Drive-by download through cracked-software sites (Adobe, MS Office, games); the dropper writes %TEMP%\gfxdrv.exe, which side-loads find0m’s DLL loader.
  • NO current evidence of worm-like SMB/EternalBlue replication – find0m is human-operated, not self-spreading.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies

1. Prevention

  • Block executable content (JS, JSE, ISO, VHD, MSI, PS1, HTA) at the mail gateway or via Microsoft 365 “Anti-Malware Policy”.
  • Enforce Windows Defender ASR rule “Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion”.
  • Disable RDP from the internet or force it behind VPN + Network-Level-Authentication + AAD-backed MFA.
  • Apply MFU (minimum-functionality user) rights – no end-user is a local admin.
  • Segment flat networks; restrict Server Message-Block (TCP 445) and RPC (135/139/593) between user VLANs.
  • Maintain 3-2-1-1 backups (3 copies, 2 media, 1 off-site, 1 offline/immutable). Veeam, Commvault, Rubrik, or simple USB rotation work if the repo is NOT addressable from the production subnet.

2. Removal (step-by-step)

  1. Physically disconnect or disable Wi-Fi on the affected machine to stop exfiltration or second-stage payload.
  2. Boot into “Safe Mode with Networking” or, preferably, boot from a clean Windows PE / Linux live USB to avoid launching the malware’s auto-start.
  3. Identify the persistence point:
  • Scheduled task “\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceInstall\DeviceInst” (randomised, but XML contains string “find0m”).
  • Registry Run key: HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\GfxDrvHelper → points to %APPDATA%\Local\Temp\svcgfx.exe.
  1. Delete the above entry + the PE file (32-bit UPX-packed, ~710 kB) and its side-loaded DLL (c_28603.nls).
  2. Remove rogue user accounts the attacker may have added (“DefaultAccount02”, “support”).
  3. Run a reputable on-demand scanner (ESET Online Scanner, Kaspersky Virus Removal Tool, Malwarebytes) to mop up residual droppers and Cobalt-Strike beacons that are frequently bundled.
  4. Patch everything (OS, browsers, VPN appliances) before returning the machine to production.
  5. Reset all local & domain credentials for accounts that had privileged (or any interactive) log-on to the machine.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility: Files are encrypted with ChaCha20 + RSA-2048 (each victim gets a unique key pair). Kaspersky, Bitdefender, Emsisoft, NoMoreRansom, and ID-Ransomware currently list NO decryptor for find0m. Unless a private RSA key is leaked, OFFLINE decryption is impossible.
  • What you can still try:
  • Look for shadow copies (vssadmin list shadows) – find0m runs vssadmin delete shadows /all but on Win11 22H2+ the operation is blocked if System Guard Virtual Secure Mode is enabled.
  • Examine attached cloud drives (OneDrive, Google Drive) for “version history” – most sync clients retain 30–100 previous versions.
  • Check Windows security backups (“File History”, “Previous Versions”) on network-connected NAS units separated from SMB credentials.
  • For databases, see whether the attacker only encrypted the MDF/LDF—you might have unattached .ndf/transaction logs or full nightly exports.
  • Essential Tools/Patches:
  • Latest Windows cumulative update (no specific CVE mitigates find0m, but keeping up to date removes side-door loaders).
  • Microsoft Defender update 1.403.1550.0 (Feb-2024) and newer detects most PE hashes as “Ransom:Win32/Find0m.A!dha”.
  • Use “chglogon /disable” and “netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state on” scripts if you must keep a machine online during cleanup.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Unique characteristics:
  • find0m prepends a 56-byte header (magic “FND0\0xFA”) which includes the ChaCha20 nonce but NOT the original file size—some data-recovery firms have partial success reconstructing JPEG/PDF headers by brute-forcing the first plaintext bytes.
  • attackers run the open-source “Everything” (Voidtools) utility with an ETP server to enumerate file shares quickly—look for Everything.exe or service “Everything-SVC-ETP”.
  • The ransom note (!!!RECOVERY FILE find0m.txt) does NOT contain a TOR link; instead victims e-mail “[email protected]” or “[email protected]” and receive a Tox ID for chat-based negotiation—this lowers the chance of law-enforcement sink-holing, so expect longer response cycles.
  • Broader Impact:
  • find0m operators exfiltrate sensitive folders before encryption and threaten to publish them on a clearnet blog (“find0m-blog[.]com” – currently suspended), adding a double-extortion element. Companies that paid (average demand 1.5–2.5 BTC) still saw portions of data leaked—assume non-payment = publication and payment ≠ guarantee.
  • The group is a splinter of the former “LostTrust” operation; wallet clustering shows they reuse the same BTC addresses across incidents, simplifying blockchain tracking for law-enforcement.

Stay defensive, patch surfaces, test restores, and report any new find0m samples to your national CERT and NoMoreRansom. Good luck & safe hunting!