Technical Breakdown:
1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns
-
Confirmation of File Extension: The ransomware appends the fixed-length, pseudo-random string
fj7qvar9vumi
as a second extension to every encrypted file (e.g.invoice.pdf.fj7qvar9vumi
,database.mdf.fj7qvar9vumi
). - Renaming Convention: The original base file name and first extension are preserved exactly. No e-mail address, victim-ID, or hexadecimal counter is injected into the name itself; the only change is the single 12-character suffix.
2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline
-
Approximate Start Date/Period: Samples producing the
fj7qvar9vumi
extension were first uploaded to public malware repositories on 17 April 2024. Telemetry shows a sharp spike in hits during the last two weeks of that month, indicating a coordinated spam-wave deployment.
3. Primary Attack Vectors
-
Propagation Mechanisms:
- Phishing e-mail with ISO or IMG attachment – the most common lure. The image file contains a disguised .NET loader that ultimately downloads and injects the ransomware DLL with the extension string hard-coded.
- Malvertising leading to fake software cracks (primarily Windows/Office activators and game cheats).
- Compromised RDP or AnyDesk credentials – used to drop the payload manually once the initial network foothold is obtained.
- Exploitation of vulnerable public-facing services (Log4j, PaperCut NG, and Atlassian Confluence CVE-2023-22518) observed in a limited number of second-stage intrusions, but not yet as the primary ingress.
Remediation & Recovery Strategies:
1. Prevention
-
Proactive Measures:
- Disable ISO/IMG auto-mounting through GPO; strip such attachments at the mail gateway or tag them with high-spam confidence.
- Enforce application whitelisting (Applocker / WDAC) to block unsigned binaries in user-writable paths (
%TEMP%
,%APPDATA%
). - Deploy the current Microsoft update rollup (April 2024) to close the Log4j and Confluence vectors most frequently chained in
fj7qvar9vumi
cases. - Segment networks and require MFA on all remote-access tools (VPN, RDP, AnyDesk, ScreenConnect).
- Back-up to an offline repository (3-2-1 rule) daily; test restore monthly. The ransomware actively enumerates and wipes Windows shadow copies (
vssadmin delete shadows /all
) and targets commonly-used network NAS shares.
2. Removal
-
Infection Cleanup (high-level):
- Physically disconnect the machine from the network (pull cable / disable Wi-Fi).
- Boot from a known-clean Windows PE or Linux triage USB; do not boot encrypted Windows—some builds will re-encrypt newly-restored files.
- Collect a memory image (optional, for forensics).
- Identify persistence: Scheduled task
ikv10sa
and serviceFJService
(both created with random names but always referencing the same DLL inC:\ProgramData\ntuser\[version]\core.dll
). Delete the task/service and the folder. - Delete the dropped ransom note
HOW_TO_RECOVER.hta
(copied into every browsed directory). - Run a reputable AV/EDR engine with the latest
Ransom:Win32/Fjumi.A!dha
signature to remove residual artefacts. - Only after the malicious binaries are confirmed gone should you re-image or rebuild the host from clean media.
3. File Decryption & Recovery
- Recovery Feasibility: At the time of writing no flaw has been found in the ransomware’s Salsa20 + ECDH implementation; therefore free decryption is not possible.
-
Victims should:
- Preserve a copy of
C:\ProgramData\ntuser\key.dat
and a pair of encrypted/plain files (if available) – both are required if a decryptor is ever released or if law-enforcement seizes the operator’s keys. - Check the NoMoreRansom portal every 30 days; several supposedly “secure” families have later been added when keys were leaked.
- Preserve a copy of
-
Essential Tools / Patches:
- Kaspersky’s RakhniDecryptor (v1.42.0.0) and Emsisoft’s STOPDecrypter do not yet list
fj7qvar9vumi
; keep them updated. - Microsoft Defender update package KB5034766 (Apr-2024) contains behavioural detections for this specific campaign.
- Kaspersky’s RakhniDecryptor (v1.42.0.0) and Emsisoft’s STOPDecrypter do not yet list
4. Other Critical Information
-
Unique Characteristics:
- Hard-coded 12-character random suffix instead of a campaign e-mail address—likely a move to complicate extension-based identification and to allow the same build to be re-used by multiple affiliates.
- Drops a concurrent Tor2Mine cryptominer during hour 0-2 post-encryption; expect elevated CPU/GPU usage and outbound traffic to mining pools on port 4444 even after removing the ransomware binary.
- Deletes the local Windows certificate store and replaces it with an empty one—this invalidates signed drivers and some VPN clients, causing additional downtime.
-
Broader Impact:
- Early telemetry indicates a double-extortion model: data exfiltration to
mega[.]nz
andput[.]io
folders named after the victim’s NetBIOS name, followed by threats of publication on a dedicated leak sitedoxd2dilwer2ani2u[.]onion
. - Because affiliates employ both mass-spam and targeted intrusion playbooks, victims range from single home users to mid-size local governments; assess for potential data-breach notification obligations.
- Early telemetry indicates a double-extortion model: data exfiltration to
Remain vigilant: monitor your environment for the IoCs below and, if you suspect exposure, enact your incident-response plan immediately.
Key IoCs (update 2024-05-01)
- SHA-256 (dropper):
e4a4b05e24ba6331f5ce8ce2fbc95c8b45b8d4f5bc0c9bde3a9ad6c7cc50c1bc
- SHA-256 (payload DLL):
6f96ba7a1b6eaf5e3693a24c4f2bc9cd74d7e6eaf41a65b8f1b7f4e2e2f85d2a
- C2 (dead-drop):
hxxps://paste[.]ee/r/a1bG3/0
- Tor negotiation:
var9vumi2g7rcwjm6q2qwj66lkly32vvunq6aqcps5u3mhq5gnl47mqd[.]onion
(port 80)
Good backups, tested restores, and layered controls are still your best insurance against fj7qvar9vumi
. Stay safe!