*wasted

[Content by Gemini 2.5]

The *wasted ransomware variant, more formally known as WastedLocker, is a highly sophisticated and destructive strain primarily known for its targeted attacks against large organizations. Developed and deployed by the notorious Evil Corp (also known as Indrik Spider), it has left a trail of significant disruption and financial demands in its wake.


Technical Breakdown:

1. File Extension & Renaming Patterns

  • Confirmation of File Extension: Files encrypted by WastedLocker adopt a unique extension pattern: .[random_string]wasted.
    • Example: A file named document.docx might be renamed to m9o4t32wasted or randomchars.wasted. The original filename is not appended to the encrypted file; instead, a short, randomized alphanumeric string is used, followed by the .wasted extension.
  • Renaming Convention: The original filename is completely replaced by a new, randomly generated eight-character string followed by the fixed .wasted extension. The full path to the encrypted file is preserved. For each encrypted file, a corresponding ransom note is created with the same random string, but with an .hta extension (e.g., m9o4t32.hta). This HTA file contains the ransom instructions and often the original file’s name to indicate what was encrypted.

2. Detection & Outbreak Timeline

  • Approximate Start Date/Period: WastedLocker was first identified and reported in June 2020. It quickly gained notoriety for its highly targeted and impactful campaigns against major corporations across various sectors. Its primary period of activity has been from mid-2020 onwards, with attacks continuing as of current observations.

3. Primary Attack Vectors

WastedLocker’s primary attack vectors reflect the highly targeted nature of Evil Corp’s operations, focusing on breaching well-defended corporate networks rather than widespread, indiscriminate attacks.

  • Propagation Mechanisms:
    • Initial Access:
      • Phishing Campaigns: Highly sophisticated spear-phishing campaigns targeting specific employees with privileged access or within critical departments. These often involve legitimate-looking emails containing malicious links or attachments (e.g., malicious Office documents or archives).
      • Exploitation of Software Vulnerabilities: Leveraging unpatched vulnerabilities in public-facing applications, VPN solutions (e.g., Pulse Secure, Fortinet, Citrix), or web servers to gain initial foothold.
      • Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Exploits: Brute-forcing weak RDP credentials or exploiting unpatched RDP vulnerabilities, especially on systems exposed to the internet.
      • Supply Chain Attacks: Although less common, there’s a possibility of compromising third-party vendors or software update mechanisms to gain access to target networks.
    • Post-Exploitation & Lateral Movement:
      • Custom Loaders: Evil Corp is known for using custom loaders, such as the JSS Loader, to deliver WastedLocker after initial breach. These loaders are often designed to evade detection.
      • Living Off The Land (LotL) Techniques: Extensive use of legitimate system tools (e.g., PowerShell, PsExec, WMIC, Net, Bitsadmin) to move laterally across the network, elevate privileges, and disable security software.
      • Cobalt Strike: This legitimate penetration testing tool is frequently abused by Evil Corp for command and control, reconnaissance, and deploying payloads within compromised networks.
      • Active Directory Exploitation: Targeting Active Directory for privilege escalation and discovery of valuable network assets.
      • Data Exfiltration: Prior to encryption, WastedLocker attacks often involve data exfiltration, adding a layer of extortion by threatening to leak sensitive information if the ransom is not paid.

Remediation & Recovery Strategies:

1. Prevention

Proactive measures are the most effective defense against WastedLocker and similar targeted ransomware.

  • Strong Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) / Antivirus (AV): Deploy and maintain next-generation EDR and AV solutions with behavioral analysis capabilities to detect and block malicious activity. Ensure signatures are up-to-date.
  • Patch Management: Implement a rigorous patch management strategy for all operating systems, applications, and network devices. Prioritize critical vulnerabilities, especially for public-facing services.
  • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Enforce MFA for all remote access, VPNs, administrative accounts, and critical internal systems.
  • Network Segmentation: Segment networks to limit lateral movement. Isolate critical servers and sensitive data to minimize the blast radius of an attack.
  • Robust Backup & Recovery Plan: Implement a “3-2-1 rule” for backups: three copies of your data, on two different media types, with one copy offsite or air-gapped. Regularly test your backup and recovery procedures.
  • Security Awareness Training: Educate employees about phishing, social engineering tactics, and the importance of strong, unique passwords.
  • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users and applications only the minimum necessary permissions to perform their tasks.
  • Disable Unnecessary Services: Disable RDP if not needed, and if it is, secure it with strong passwords, MFA, and network-level authentication.
  • Regular Auditing and Monitoring: Continuously monitor network traffic, system logs, and user activity for suspicious behavior.

2. Removal

Removing WastedLocker requires a systematic approach to ensure complete eradication.

  1. Isolate Infected Systems: Immediately disconnect any detected infected systems from the network to prevent further spread.
  2. Identify Initial Point of Compromise (IPC): Use forensic tools to determine how the attackers gained access. This is crucial for preventing re-infection.
  3. Containment and Eradication:
    • Disable Malicious Processes: Use task manager or advanced forensic tools to terminate any running WastedLocker processes.
    • Remove Malicious Files: Locate and delete all WastedLocker executables, loaders (e.g., JSS Loader), and associated files. Scan thoroughly with updated EDR/AV solutions.
    • Clean Up Persistence Mechanisms: Check common persistence locations (e.g., Registry Run keys, Startup folders, Scheduled Tasks, WMI event subscriptions) for malicious entries and remove them.
    • Remove Attacker Tools: Scan for and remove any legitimate but abused tools (e.g., Cobalt Strike beacons, mimikatz, PsExec) left behind by the attackers.
    • Change All Compromised Credentials: Assume all credentials used on the network are compromised and force a password reset for all users and service accounts, starting with domain administrators. Implement strong, unique passwords.
  4. Forensic Analysis: Conduct a thorough forensic investigation to understand the scope of the breach, data exfiltration (if any), and attacker TTPs.

3. File Decryption & Recovery

  • Recovery Feasibility: As of current knowledge, there is NO publicly available decryptor for WastedLocker. The ransomware uses a robust encryption scheme (AES-256 for files, RSA-2048 for the AES key) and the private decryption keys are exclusively held by the attackers. Recovering encrypted files without paying the ransom (which is strongly discouraged by law enforcement agencies) is generally not possible.
  • Methods/Tools Available (for recovery, not decryption):
    • Backups: The primary and most reliable method for recovery is to restore data from uninfected, recent backups. Ensure backups are thoroughly scanned before restoration.
    • Shadow Copies (Volume Shadow Copies – VSS): While WastedLocker attempts to delete shadow copies, in some cases, if the attack was interrupted or specific configurations were present, older shadow copies might still exist and could be used for recovery of some files. However, reliance on VSS alone is not recommended.
  • Essential Tools/Patches:
    • Endpoint Security: Up-to-date EDR/NGAV solutions (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, etc.).
    • Patch Management Software: For automating and ensuring timely application of security updates.
    • Vulnerability Scanners: To identify and remediate weaknesses in your infrastructure (e.g., Nessus, Qualys, OpenVAS).
    • Forensic Toolkits: For detailed analysis and evidence collection during an incident (e.g., Autopsy, Volatility Framework).
    • Network Monitoring Tools: To detect anomalous traffic and lateral movement.

4. Other Critical Information

  • Additional Precautions:
    • Highly Targeted Nature: Unlike opportunistic ransomware, WastedLocker campaigns are highly targeted at specific large enterprises. This means attackers often conduct extensive reconnaissance, making prevention through basic security hygiene paramount.
    • No C2 for Decryption: A unique characteristic is that WastedLocker often does not rely on a Command and Control (C2) server for decryption keys. The keys required for decryption are often generated offline by the attackers or embedded within the ransomware payload in such a way that the victim has no means of recovery without direct interaction (and payment) to the threat actors.
    • Financial Motivation (Evil Corp): WastedLocker is primarily operated by Evil Corp, a well-known, financially motivated Russian cybercrime group that has been under U.S. sanctions. They are known for demanding extremely high ransom amounts (often millions of dollars) and are associated with other notorious malware like Dridex and TrickBot.
    • Data Exfiltration: Be aware that WastedLocker operations often involve data exfiltration prior to encryption. This adds a “double extortion” threat, where attackers not only encrypt data but also threaten to leak it publicly if the ransom is not paid.
  • Broader Impact:
    • Significant Financial Losses: WastedLocker has caused immense financial damage to its victims, including ransom payments (when made), recovery costs, reputational damage, and operational downtime.
    • Disruption of Critical Services: Attacks have impacted diverse sectors, including manufacturing, IT, transportation, and professional services, leading to disruption of critical business operations.
    • Regulatory Scrutiny: Organizations targeted by WastedLocker (especially those that have made ransom payments) may face increased scrutiny from government agencies, particularly given U.S. sanctions against Evil Corp.
    • Heightened Security Awareness: The sophistication and impact of WastedLocker have underscored the urgent need for robust cybersecurity defenses, incident response plans, and investment in threat intelligence for large organizations.